ah now we're talking. so it's a n@s attack with borrowed stake after all.
The attack can come from both borrowed stake or existing stake. In the case of NxT there are a few early stakeholders who could start the attack immediately
without borrowing anything. Have you guys read kushtis paper that debunks n@s providing actual math?
here's the tl:dr
not possible at the moment. As always: I'm interested to be proven wrong.
kushtis himself disagrees with you:
- we have formally defined nothing-at-stake attack(again, using Buterin's informal definition) and made initial simulations. We haven't included their results in paper as they are seems to be too raw, but I can reveal them here: N@S attack could happens only in short-range, e.g. for within 20 blocks for 10% stake, so with 30 confirmations we haven't observed the successful attack. Also please note the attack has pretty unpredictable nature for attacker, so he can hardly enforce it, even in theory(in practice it's even harder to get it done properly). The correlation with stake size is still the open question, but it's nearly impossible to attack a proof-of-stake currency with "1% stake even" as stated by Buterin
Additionally, please don't generalize all PoS coins as kushtis paper only applies to certain forms of PoS.
Here is the paper I think you were trying to link to:
https://github.com/ConsensusResearch/articles-papers/blob/master/multistrategy/multistrategy.pdf