Re: [ANN][DRK] Darkcoin | First Anonymous Coin | Inventor of X11, DGW, Darksend and InstantX
LETS ASSUME A WORST CASE SCENARIO
50% of MN's are run by "bad actors" or have backdoors (thru VSP provider consent)
Question:Why did TOR get compromised??
Answer: NSA style traffic analysis
Just like TOR ur crypto (such as it is i.e. antiquated) is prob sound. But how do you combat NSA style traffic analysis for MN's?
Ignore me if you want
but this is another important question complements of yous truly.
Answers on a postcard
50% of MN's are run by "bad actors" or have backdoors (thru VSP provider consent)
Question:Why did TOR get compromised??
Answer: NSA style traffic analysis
Just like TOR ur crypto (such as it is i.e. antiquated) is prob sound. But how do you combat NSA style traffic analysis for MN's?
Ignore me if you want
but this is another important question complements of yous truly.
Answers on a postcard
I'll bite. Assuming there were 50% rogue nodes, each round would be an independent event, in this case 50/50 that a compromised node is selected processing the transaction. To be able to prove with reasonable doubt, you would need to have your rogue nodes selected every round, or 50%^# of rounds for probability. At 4 rounds, you're looking at a 6.25% chance of having your rogue nodes selected every round, at 8 rounds, 0.39%, at 16 rounds, .0015%. That's just as the system stands right now--with masternode blinding which is currently in development, no single node would have all the inputs so your probabilities essentially go to 0.
Good try.
Yeah I think he did try very hard, but his attempt discredits him even more.
@oblox
I suppose I was really making three points:
1) CRYPTO:What happens if 50% of MN's are run by "bad actors" or have backdoors (thru VSP provider consent)
Comment:
The answer of ~6% if 4 rounds chosen was the answer given. Interesting but not really to my point. BTW What is the avg no. of rounds usually selected? What is the default number?
2 ) FLOW: Since MN's have static IP's (at this time) and are obvious targets for traffic flow analysis how can u combat traffic flow analysis like "upstreaming" which were used to compromise TOR?"
As I said initially it is not so much the crypto that is the weakness (albeit slightly outdated imo), but rather the patterns derived from traffic analysis techniques like "upstreaming" which may reveal sensitive information.
Comment:
Certainly every crypto-currency network is also threatened by such analysis, but for DRK it is the limited number of MN's currently sitting on fixed IP's which make a juicy target. The crypto in TOR was by all accounts strong and it was these sorts of attacks which compromised TOR's security iirc. Interestingly there were similar numbers of TOR nodes that you have MN's. I'm thinking maybe 3-4k TOR nodes were being run worldwide.
Perhaps MN's will have to grow in number to help deal with this and maybe a 500DRK sum should be permitted to run an MN so as to create more. In fact why shouldn't every node be capable of serving as an MN? And if DRK adopts a ZK (Zero-Knowledge) solution like Shadow then why have MN's at all (InstantX I guess)
3) BLEND: A "blended attack" where a bad actor runs (or has access to) a number of MN's combined with traffic analysis is most likely the true threat model here. It is unclear to me at this point if "Masternode blinding' might help the bad actors as much as the good ones.
Comment:
?
Throwing it to the floor.