1st there is not a single nash equlibrium (not to mention that it may not even be a single point but a closed trajectory in the solution space) It is highly sensitive to the initial parameters, one could at least  set the initial parameters so (Rig the game) so that players eventually gravitate to the optimum eq.

however in central planning choice is striped from the players (not freedom) so nash equlibrium is irrelevant as there is no game and only the computational tractability of calculating the global oprimal is the problem. When that is no longer an issue, there is no point in trying to find a solution using a computationaly cheap distributed algo as in a game.

As we move to more accessible market parameters ie public transactions, public performance records, and higher computational power wtr local knowledge and low cpu power of the past. combined with the necessity of higher efficiency. I see/predict that free market with all its problems will be abandoned in the end