Eliminate the possibility of a 51% attack...
how?
this is something that may work well for now, is an idea about a code to be added just in case
Something like "ignore a longer chain orphaning the current best chain if the sum(priorities of transactions included in new chain) is much less than sum(priorities of transactions in the part of the current best chain that would be orphaned)" would mean a 51% attacker would have to have both lots of hashing power AND lots of old, high-priority bitcoins to keep up a transaction-denial-of-service attack. And they'd pretty quickly run out of old, high-priority bitcoins and would be forced to either include other people's transactions or have their chain rejected.http://gavintech.blogspot.it/2012/05/neutralizing-51-attack.htmlCouldn't they just get around that by doing their own high priority transactions?