^ 
Good piece. Once a direct neural to computer interfaces reach the point where neurons can interact intimately with data, the bony veil of our skull will be lifted and our brain's capacity will expand into computer assisted consciousness. Though some may want to sit in their dusty recliners and muse (too much) over the meaning of symbols, without really getting that it's subjective and can't be redistributed in the value driven world with out some sort of mental violence--usually in the form of name and link dropping. I want to be inside the computer and see what alien values arise, if any....
Good piece. Once a direct neural to computer interfaces reach the point where neurons can interact intimately with data, the bony veil of our skull will be lifted and our brain's capacity will expand into computer assisted consciousness. Though some may want to sit in their dusty recliners and muse (too much) over the meaning of symbols, without really getting that it's subjective and can't be redistributed in the value driven world with out some sort of mental violence--usually in the form of name and link dropping. I want to be inside the computer and see what alien values arise, if any....
how can you be certain of anyone else's existence but your own?
Quote from: Axel Cleeremans. The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the Brain Learns to Be Conscious. _Frontiers in Psychology_ 2 (2011). 10-1. Web. 30 Mar. 2015.
That system would then be able to identify cases where the latter exists in the absence of the former, and hence, to learn to distinguish between cases of veridical perception and cases of hallucination. Such internal monitoring is viewed here as constitutive of conscious experience: A mental state is a conscious mental state when the system that possesses this mental state is (at least non-conceptually) sensitive to its existence. Thus, and unlike what is assumed to be case in HOT Theory, meta-representations can be both subpersonal and non-conceptual.
No mechanism whereby a self could ascertain the extrinsic-thereto could exist extrinsic to it; therefore, the self cannot be (conclusively) said to perceive anything beyond itself. However, the self is an element of the phenomenology of consciousness and exists within the real only insofar as the "meta-representations" (Cleeremans 1, 4, 6-7, 10-1) that precipitate it so exist.
Live in your own bony box. I'll go where my bliss takes me.
