decision to force a fee market is a centralized solution
On it's face this is a nonsense argument since any development decisions are centralized in the same manner.
Increase the blocksize, decrease the blocksize, or leave it alone, they are all (centralized) development decisions.
It's also false that anything is really centralized about it because if there were truly a consensus for change (over the objections of the 'centralized' developers) there would be a successful fork.
Yes all dev decisions are essentially centralized, including the decision to NOT do something. Since that is trivially true, I am talking about the effect of the decision. And in one case miners can optimize their profitability by choosing to include transactions while in another case they are artificially limited.
Listen to New Liberty, he got this completely right. Whether miners can optimize
their profitability is beside the point, because in doing so they also influence
others' costs, and they are most certainly
not optimizing that.
The idea of a sensible market arising for block size in the current structure if the consensus block size rule (which is the only mechanism for the "others" in the previous paragraph to participate in such a market) is a fantasy.
i don't get this at all. as a former miner, given all the investment in mining equipment one has to make along with all the labor and ongoing costs, any profit the miner makes is deserved; and it's often not that much of a profit. full nodes, otoh, only have to rent a vps at most which is minimal cost.
all this complaining by LukeJr et al about everyone else
forcing him to bear costs in Bitcoin is ridiculous. by running a full node you're helping to prop your investment in the coin and you should be using it to secure your own tx's; which should be a security measure you're willing to pay for. as the user base grows, if we let it, then merchant base grows with it and they will be more than willing from a security and fiduciary standpoint to increase the availability of full nodes across the network.
and as far as game theory with miners goes, they sure do have an incentive to optimize the size of their blocks thru fear of orphaning and thru fear of causing disruption to full nodes and users which both would decrease their surrounding security and tx throughput in terms of fees by users. not to mention constantly having a Damocle's Sword over their heads via their hashers who can move to another pool in an instant.