That research is already cited in my white paper on the correct way to design an anonymity network. Fingerprinting and also internet routing subversion are two of the recent ways discovered to unmask anonymity networks.

The bandaids that are proposed will never entirely solve the underlying problem. I do a paradigm shift on command & control to fix that problem (and any other attack that can be devised) at the fundamental basis. It is similar in a high-level abstraction to how I fixed proof-of-work networks and separately found a complete solution to the expression problem of modularity in software. I am on a roll recently in terms of discovery. The conceptual discoveries are pouring out of me at such a rapid rate, that I can't even keep up with writing them down in white papers.

There are three white papers under construction thus far:

• improving upon on chain anonymity math
• scalable, uncensorable proof-of-work network design (with plugin interface for transaction protocol, i.e. use what ever you like, Cryptonote, Confidential Transactions, or my new on chain anonymity design)
• fixed design for anonymity networks and hidden services (to fix or replace Tor, I2P, and Bitmessage). Perhaps this will be integrated with someone else's work.

Yet no one can work with me   Nevermind!  

Here follows a little spanking for those who think I am not an expert...


Angel investors (even $3000 is enough) who implement the required computer security procedures will receive copies of all the white papers and code ongoing so they can take over if something happens to me where I can't continue. Obviously conflicts of interest prevent me from recruiting certain coveted angel investors who I'd benefit to have advising me and checking my work, e.g. smooth. I offered angel investors (of which there is only one so far who I took funding from and few others who are ready to give funding) a deal where they get more coins per $ invested than later investors.

The required security procedures include to minimally to build a correctly configured air gapped computer.

This means purchasing a 2nd computer that you build yourself and install Linux so that you can be sure it was never connected to the internet nor never plugged into any peripheral that had ever been plugged into any other device. Even one violation of this policy and the air gapped computer is no longer provably secure! A $75 Rasberry Pi 2 can satisfy this requirement and it even ships with the preload N00bs Linux operating system on a microSD card. I suppose a millionaire could afford $75 for an air gapped computer which they should already be using for their crypto wallet! You'd probably want to let someone else order this for you, so some adversary isn't trying to intercept it during shipment and infect it with spyware.

Due to the programmable USB controller firmware (and not being able to reliably determine which USB devices are reprogrammable), then no USB pluggable peripheral (e.g. USB keyboards, mice, flash drives, webcams, etc) can be safely plugged into one computer and then another. For example, your USB flash drive can be reprogrammed to masquerade as both a drive and an undetectable keyboard. The firmware can't even be scanned for malware (spyware) because the firmware controls the scanning of itself! Thus you can not use a USB flash drive to do the sneakernet for transfering files between your internet facing computer and the air gapped computer. I have a solution to this but I will not type it here, because it is covered in one of my white papers and that would surely identify me as the author of the white paper. Mircea Popescu (alias MPEX/MPOE-PR who provided that upthread photo of a naked brown skinned female touching her vagina) recommends an optical scanner solution, but that is highly impractical. I have an elegant solution which I realized by researching the nature of the threat.

Then employing 7zip encrypt/decryption and base64 encode/decode utilities so all data is encrypted/decrypted and encoded/decoded to text files on the air gapped computer and then transferred via the secure method to the internet facing computer and then sent by copy+paste into Bitmessage on the internet facing computer. This is essentially NSA proof, for as long as you always carry the air-gapped computer with you every where you go. Remember the government has secret agents in every city on earth and can't break into your office or home and plant spyware on your computer without you ever noticing. If you are a public figure of interest, you can assume they've already done it.

Never transfer virus capable files to your air gapped computer such as PDF files. No more white papers in PDF formats! Grrr. Any altcoin publishing white papers in PDF format has already admitted they are clueless, inept, or not that serious!

The point herein is we'd like to fall through the cracks and be basically unnoticed.

To that end, it would be much better to replace Bitmessage with an improvement asap (which would also be easier to use and deploy thus more popular and thus a larger anonymity set to fall into the cracks of). With the Bitmessage decrypting from your Bitmessage address key on the internet facing computer, then if the spyware isn't in your air gapped computer but is in your internet facing computer, then your anonymity is gone even though the adversary can't read your 7zip encrypted data. Well then you might as well just use email and 7zip then! So to retain anonymity with certainty, we need to take extra measures.

The first step would be to construct a new internet facing computer which you will not use for any activity except the very focused and limited activity required, e.g. a dedicated, home built, Linux computer with all unnecessary ports turned off, the firewall turned on, and only used for Bitmessage.

The next step beyond that level, would be to build an app that is better than Bitmessage which knows how to interopt with an air gapped computer.

And then other things we can do beyond that in terms of secure hardware and operating systems, c.f. Skycoin's thread as he writes about this frequently...

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Edit: I just noticed this strange post from gmaxwell on MPOE-PR's reputation:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?action=trust;u=52741


So I checked out the alleged $7000 theft and clearly it is some attempt to blame the ineptness of the "victim" to use a wallet of his choosing on someone other than himself.

Thus I conclude again that Gregory Maxwell is a closet socialist, control freak who believes the world should operate according to some consumer protection laws.

Individual responsibility is only motivated by not providing a nanny state.