He's right though, even people well versed in the technical aspects of Bitcoin have a hard time predicting all the various scenarios that can go wrong with proof of stake, let alone a full blown eMunie phonebook of variables. You then have people like Kushti and Buterin trying to mathematically prove that proof of stake can rival or beat proof of work's security model in post's like this:
http://blog.ethereum.org/2014/11/25/proof-stake-learned-love-weak-subjectivity/Since they have such a hard time quantifying the security model of simpler concepts like PoW vs PoS, how many decades will it take to quantify the security model of emunie?
POW and POS are not true Byzantine solutions though, where I believe that eMunie is. So it should be easy to quantify its security, when proof of tolerance is apparent.
I'm currently communicating with some respected academics that have no association with Bitcoin, block chains, or crypto-currencies in general. This is so as to prevent reviewers making assumptions about the technology by aligning it with current block chain technologies, and to safeguard against any bias, motives to discredit the algorithm other than for good reason.
I'm sure most of these individuals wouldn't risk their reputation by publishing falsehoods in a peer review, only to be subsequently exposed when peers of their own review the algorithm for themselves...but you never know.
Furthermore, I don't believe the eMunie trust consensus is any more complicated than POW or POS, it is in fact quite simple, and simple enough to describe in 3 short sentences.
"Actions contain metadata which nominate 3rd party actors as trustworthy at that time. 3rd party actors prove their trustworthiness via Proof of Work challenges. Trustworthy actors can then have influence on conflicts and arrive at a majority solution."