Quote from: smoothie on September 09, 2015, 08:21:47 PM

I'm not sure how it can be "delegated" and not require trust in some form or fashion.

You didn't pay close attention to the phrases "verifiable truth" and "they make no discretionary choices of significance, persist the minimum state possible, are fungible with each other" I bolded in the generous excerpt that I quoted from my white paper draft.

If I delegate to you, but you have no choice in how you execute the delegated task, then I don't have to trust you.

I will not tell you the precise inventions of how I do that. Absolutely no hints will be given on that for now. Sorry.

Quote from: traumschiff on September 09, 2015, 08:19:49 PM

Quote from: ion.cash on September 09, 2015, 07:36:47 PM

These attacks can be squelched if for observers and peers their system function is verifiable truth, they can prove a trusted reputation, or they can expend or risk sufficient resources which exceed the gain from cheating.

Also DASH solved the last problem with an entry barrier of 1k DASH for masternodes.

You refer to the game theory of the bounded entropy of buying influence a verifiable truth. Roll Eyes

I refer you back to the opening post:

Quote from: ion.cash on September 09, 2015, 02:50:02 AM

...while retaining proof-of-work as unbounded entropy[1]:

...

[1] My position until I am convinced otherwise is that all non-proof-of-work consensus systems have a bounded entropy (e.g. the total stake and/or any initial seeds used for randomization) and thus their attributes (e.g. decentralization, censorship resistance, DoS resistance, Sybil attack resistance, impartiality) is subject to a game theory which is potentially undiscovered. Whereas, the entropy of proof-of-work is unbounded because it is externally added and the game theory is well defined.

I prefer the objectivity of Satoshi's trustless entropy, especially since I rendered pools and ASICs economically irrelevant in my design.