I disagree with this analysis. In analyzing incentives it is often important to have an option to do something even if that option in rarely exercised in practice. For one thing, it puts a cap on the degree of abuse that can be performed by those who can be opted out...
However, in Bitcoin if the pool system were to be became sufficiently abusive (but it likely won't by the argument in the third sentence of the previous paragraph), miners really could just opt out entirely and solo mine. It would have a cost, but the cost is bounded and even measurable.
This is another epic logic fail.
You love to argue ad nauseum points that are not viable.
Fact is that mining will become ever more centralized in Satoshi's design because of the economies-of-scale of ASICs and electrical power. I believe there was maybe even a research paper that proved something along these lines?
I'm not aware of such a paper.
The fundamental problem is the mining is done for profit. For as long as that is the case, ASIC farms (or Larry Summers' 21 Inc. economies-of-scale) and subsidized, industrial/government/utility scale electricity will rule.
Also due to bandwidth issues and that every full mining node has to validate every transaction, scaling transaction volume will force centralization.
Maybe correct, but depends on assumptions about future costs and technology which are hard to make soundly with certainty. Bandwidth, etc. may become too cheap to matter. The new iPhone has 300 megabit (peak; ideal) wireless capability. Comcast is promising to upgrade their entire network to 1-10 gigabit within three years without needing fibre to the home.
In any case, that's not the same delegation argument r0ach was making. Pool mining and centralized mining is not the same thing.
These are precisely some of the core issues my Delegated Transaction Consensus design is attempting to fix.
Great. Go finish it.