Re: What 2.0 Currency will be the most successful?
Once again "pooled staking" isn't "required in NXT".
It is and I already explained why. Claiming pooled staking isn't required in NXT is like claiming pooled mining isn't required in Bitcoin. You can only claim it's not required while the coin is in it's infancy, not the endgame.
"Pooled staking" isn't required now in NXT nor will it be required in the future. Running a node will only cost ~$30 a year regardless of your stake. There is no mining hardware that must ROI in a set amount of time that would force people into pools to ensure they can pay off their investment. What don't you get about this?
You cannot "audit" under the table dealings and secret arrangements between delegates.
That's called collusion and affects all three systems: PoW, PoS, and DPoS. Claiming collusion can only happen in DPoS is borderline comedy. Here's some differences for PoW vs DPoS collusion, which also affect PoS:
Quote
There are two kinds of attacks that apply to POW and DPOS:
(1) "Malicious campaigning": A mining pool can attract miners only in order to attack. Equally a delegate can attract stakeholder votes only in order to attack.
(2) "Bribing": One can try to bribe mining pool operators and delegates with the same potential for harm. In both cases stakeholders respectively miners can switch delegates respectively mining pools if the bribe attack becomes apparent.
The differences are:
(a) There are more delegates to bribe or campaign for than there are mining pools.
(b) Delegates have made a commitment to work in the interest of stakeholders whereas mining pool operators work in the interest of miners who's first interest is not necessarily the health of the Bitcoin network.
(c) Mining / POW is less efficient in terms of costs per security gained which in the end has to be paid by the user or by inflation / creating new coins although this is very difficult to estimate. What has to be compared is energy costs and mining hardware costs on the one side (POW) vs. voter attention costs minus the bigger number of block producers (more security), minus the extra security through the advantages of reputation and commitment, see above (DPOS)."
Source: http://consensus-analytics.com/
(1) "Malicious campaigning": A mining pool can attract miners only in order to attack. Equally a delegate can attract stakeholder votes only in order to attack.
(2) "Bribing": One can try to bribe mining pool operators and delegates with the same potential for harm. In both cases stakeholders respectively miners can switch delegates respectively mining pools if the bribe attack becomes apparent.
The differences are:
(a) There are more delegates to bribe or campaign for than there are mining pools.
(b) Delegates have made a commitment to work in the interest of stakeholders whereas mining pool operators work in the interest of miners who's first interest is not necessarily the health of the Bitcoin network.
(c) Mining / POW is less efficient in terms of costs per security gained which in the end has to be paid by the user or by inflation / creating new coins although this is very difficult to estimate. What has to be compared is energy costs and mining hardware costs on the one side (POW) vs. voter attention costs minus the bigger number of block producers (more security), minus the extra security through the advantages of reputation and commitment, see above (DPOS)."
Source: http://consensus-analytics.com/
Collusion doesn't affect PoW or PoS like it effects DPoS. By removing the requirement that miners/forgers purchase hardware/stake and replacing it with a corrupt voting mechanism, you have made it much easier for a small group of manipulators to control the entire network by effectively rigging the delegate elections through strategic voting.
It's been proven that a very small amount of the Bitshares' shareholders can effectively control the entire delegate selection process through strategic voting.
http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-analysis/blog/why-approval-voting-is-unworkable-in-contested-elections/
http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-analysis/blog/why-approval-voting-is-unworkable-in-contested-elections/
Your ridiculous link is entirely based on examples of a single winner election, not several people. It also goes onto state that all voting systems are flawed. Try harder attempting to turn opinion into facts next time.
Approval voting is still flawed for multiple winner elections too. I've conclusively shown how a small amount of stakeholders can determine the outcome of the majority of the delegate elections. Everybody should ask themselves why wasn't a fair voting system implemented which only allowed one vote per stake instead of "approval" voting which allows one vote per stake for each and every delegate election?
currently 216 forgers independently operating on the NXT network[/url].
Lol, what a distortion of reality. You have the equivalent of a DPoS network of 20 people in that, while the rest are people who get blocks so infrequently they don't even matter because like I said earlier: All that matters is how often the top block producers are validating blocks in relation to each other.
The further time goes by, the more that mining pool chart will look like the current Bitcoin pool chart as well.
The whole reason approval voting was chosen was so that Stan, Dan, and a select group of manipulators could effectively rig all the delegate elections so they can control the entire network. I highly suspect that almost all of the delegates are under the influence of these said manipulators. DPoS has the equivalent of one PoW pool. NXT will get more and more block producers as time goes on and the percentage of blocks produced by each individual will diminish the more the currency is distributed.
But let's get to the real point of why you do so much NXT shilling:
I'm not any of those people on NXT's forums. TF is already implemented except for economic clustering. Economic clustering isn't needed now because the network tps isn't high enough. Just like DPoS isn't needed because your network tps isn't high enough but you insist on implementing it anyway and the only rational conclusion one can draw is that it was implemented to centralize PoS.
None of this really matters anyway. Nobody with any common sense will use bitshares because it requires 300% collateral and as Preston Byrne puts it: "These transactions make no commercial sense."
I seem to have lost my bitcointalk login password, so can someone please cross-post this for me. Thanks.
Like anybody really believes that. You just don't want to come on this forum and be confronted with questions you don't want to answer.