The record of who are the majority throughout the history of time must be recorded in the history of the consensus, otherwise there is no consensus about what the majority was and thus what it is now.
That's not correct, the consensus now is all that matters. For instance as humans we don't have a record of all governments and all decisions going back to the beginning of time yet we have a consensus about what we agree to at this moment. A historical record can be interesting but the only thing that matters is consensus at this current point in time, only historians care about anything else and currency isn't about a history lesson.
Perhaps you missed the fact that I already stated that without recording of the voting, there is no way to know when "now" is as it pertains to confirmation of consensus being attained. How is the payee supposed to know when to trust the payment and release the goods or services?
Without recording the voting, the confirmation of a transaction is unknown (nebulous).
For example, if someone controlled sufficient coins in the past (greater than the number of coins that were locked for voting in the current public consensus history), they could erase the entire history from that point,
This seems to be erroneous. Historical consensus cannot override contemporary consensus, contemporary consensus is the only thing that matters with RaiBlocks. The only way to erase history is for the current consensus to flip blocks a.k.a. a true, >50% attack.
This is because you have no objective means of determining which set of "now" is the reality. Thus you assume that the online nodes will just magically agree on the "now" they all have. The fact that you can't see that you've failed to even define the way the majority chain is objectively determined, should be indicative of that you are not sufficiently knowledgeable to design a new block chain paradigm.
Two or more errors don't make it correct. You can state that your system flies to the moon and if that assumption is based on foundational errors then no one can disprove your claim. The proof will come in the fantastic devolution of your system in the wild.
Also you seem to have lost the point that if the historical coins locked was only 1% of the coin supply, then only 1.1% of the coin supply would need to be retroactively locked to rewrite history in the lack of durable objectivity in your system.
I am not going to go back and forth with you on the comedy of errors. It is a pointless waste of my scarce time.
by publishing a new block for their historical UTXO (even if they historically spent them subsequent to the historical block where they were UTXO) locking their coins for voting and then voting to make their revision of history the dominant majority.
This is describing a >50% attack, all cryptocurrencies are vulnerable to this though RaiBlocks give a stronger guarantee. With RaiBlocks >50% of the MARKET CAP needs to vote to flip, with PoW only 50% of the mining strength needs to flip. If you look at BitCoin's market cap of ~4billion, and ask: could you gain majority mining power with ~2 billion in mining hardware? Absolutely. PoW is a weaker guarantee.
Logic fail. You are assuming every coin is locked so every coin votes, which means no coins can be transacted. Duh.
, if you don't store the history then there is no way for a node which is not omniscient to know what the objective consensus is without invoking trust (and decentralized currency must be trustless else it devolves in numerous ways to centralized currency).
That's true, in fact most people who use bitcoin are invoking trust because they trust the wallet they're using to correctly evaluate which chain has the highest block work and not log the password to their private keys.
You habitually conflate orthogonal concepts.
Even if the vast majority of users do not run full nodes, the security of Bitcoin is still based on the objectivity of the full nodes, which your design does not possess.
Assuming you work out how to penalize short-term adversarial activity (and not just rely on the non-quantitative game theory myopia that adversaries won't be self-interested because they devalue the coin and thus their holdings in the coin)
You're stating this is myopic but this is the exact rhetoric people use when rebutting against why miners wouldn't start mining forks in to BitCoin. Destroying the protocol destroys future profit in the protocol hence it's in the miner's and voter's best interest to come to consensus instead of creating volatility. This seems to be a fundamentally flawed application of game theory.
The astute people such as Gregory Maxwell understand how critical it is that no party has 51% or even 25% of the network hashrate. Do not let what fools write misdirect you on the objectivity of Bitcoin.