Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin?
It is 3:30am and I been awake since 7am, so please excuse if this reads like I am drunk.
How do you deal with user A with a very slow device sending a transaction vs user B with a mining farm sending a transaction? I.e why can't B push the difficulty up so high as to make sending a transaction impossible for A?
Because A is not required to increase the PoW difficulty (number of leading 0 bits) for the PoW required to be submitted with a transaction. It is not used to rate limit spam. The only purpose is to get every payer to contribute something to the security. Again as I explained in the prior message, for as long as no entity has control over (near to) 100% of the PoW, their asymmetric leverage is fairly impotent.
Even most mobile phones has SIMD Neon now, so their performance on BLAKE2 would only about be about 1/4 - 1/10. However the PoW hash I designed is optimized for desktop processors due to the highly optimized carryless multiply instruction in the AES_NI. So mobile phones might end up with a noticeable delay. There is a sweet spot to balance this, because devices will get faster over time, and there are a lot more mobile devices than desktop PCs these days. Will choose some reasonably balanced level, and the goal is to maintain at least a few percent (if not better) of the network PoW hash rate coming from distributed users instead of 100% from professional farms.
Edit: it is possible to have two PoW hash function alternatives if it can be determined that the relative advantage for ASICs for the SIMD BLAKE2 hash is compensated relative to the PoW function that I designed which uses the carryless multiply instruction. Thus it might be possible to leverage the SIMD NEON in mobile phones.
Yes and no. Bitcoin's security is not orthogonal to the block reward - it is tied directly to it. If you assume hashing power is proportional to reward, interpolating the hashing power at 25 BTC per block down to the average amount of transaction fees per block, the security of the chain diminishes accordingly.
As I wrote in my prior post, all that matters is what percentage of your market cap you are paying to debasement over any period of time, and that determines how much electricity can be spent each such period on PoW. But more debasement doesn't lower the ratio of professional miners to distributed non-professional miners, thus it really doesn't increase security. It is isn't a defense against a 51% attack, because more debasement doesn't correlate with better distribution of PoW resources. It is basically nonsense and we've been hoodwinked into throwing our money away to professional miners who are siphoning all the value out of Bitcoin by mining at < $50 per BTC cost. (Edit: and then by roughly 2032 or sooner, Bitcoin completely dies because mining funding has to come nearly all from transactions and the coin becomes highly deflationary, but long before then we will have replaced Bitcoin)
This is why I have tried to move entirely away from viewing PoW as security, because it isn't by itself security. I view PoW only a Sybil prevention mechanism for obtaining a consensus on nominated resources, which an aspect of driving the security of the inertia that results from those resources. Without PoW, anyone could nominate themselves and there'd be no convergence of the inertia (which is the precisely what I expect for Iota once someone writes a client other than the one they release to game theory their protocol) other than meta-protocol convention and community coordination.
I look forward to reading more details about your definition of inertia as it pertains to consensus design with great enthusiasm
The key is that when propagation is orders-of-magnitude faster than the block period, and there is no way to Sybil attack the network due to PoW consensus, then lying about having not propagated is statistically and objectively filterable as fraud. Thus the 51% attack falls away. There are more details that need to be explained.
In Satoshi's design the nodes want to be on the longest chain of PoW. In my design, they want to be on the longest chain of PoW which is not incongruent with the propagated inertia. There are two aspects (PoW and inertia) interlocking and supporting each other synergistically. The reason Bitcoin (Satoshi's design) can't do this distinction is because there is no inertia orthogonal to PoW. If you are thinking the PoW nominates the inertia, so the inertia is not orthogonal, then don't forget another key detail which is duration of nomination is much greater than any statistically objective honest orphan chain length (duration). Essentially my design is a form of anti-aliasing. More PoW resources can gain a larger share of the inertia, but the thing about inertia is that each participant views their own inertia as a priority and so any entity trying to blacklist another's inertia is going to be viewed statistically and objectively as fraudulent and thus that fraudulent PoW can be filtered out and its inertia spirals down. In other words, greater share of resources doesn't allow you to violate the laws of physics about propagation.
Difficulty is adjusted as it is always is for PoW.
How do you deal with user A with a very slow device sending a transaction vs user B with a mining farm sending a transaction? I.e why can't B push the difficulty up so high as to make sending a transaction impossible for A?
Because A is not required to increase the PoW difficulty (number of leading 0 bits) for the PoW required to be submitted with a transaction. It is not used to rate limit spam. The only purpose is to get every payer to contribute something to the security. Again as I explained in the prior message, for as long as no entity has control over (near to) 100% of the PoW, their asymmetric leverage is fairly impotent.
Even most mobile phones has SIMD Neon now, so their performance on BLAKE2 would only about be about 1/4 - 1/10. However the PoW hash I designed is optimized for desktop processors due to the highly optimized carryless multiply instruction in the AES_NI. So mobile phones might end up with a noticeable delay. There is a sweet spot to balance this, because devices will get faster over time, and there are a lot more mobile devices than desktop PCs these days. Will choose some reasonably balanced level, and the goal is to maintain at least a few percent (if not better) of the network PoW hash rate coming from distributed users instead of 100% from professional farms.
Edit: it is possible to have two PoW hash function alternatives if it can be determined that the relative advantage for ASICs for the SIMD BLAKE2 hash is compensated relative to the PoW function that I designed which uses the carryless multiply instruction. Thus it might be possible to leverage the SIMD NEON in mobile phones.
The profitability is orthogonal to your point, which is you mean how to get Bitcoin's security if the percentage of your market cap paid to mining debasement and the market cap are not the same level as for Bitcoin.
Yes and no. Bitcoin's security is not orthogonal to the block reward - it is tied directly to it. If you assume hashing power is proportional to reward, interpolating the hashing power at 25 BTC per block down to the average amount of transaction fees per block, the security of the chain diminishes accordingly.
As I wrote in my prior post, all that matters is what percentage of your market cap you are paying to debasement over any period of time, and that determines how much electricity can be spent each such period on PoW. But more debasement doesn't lower the ratio of professional miners to distributed non-professional miners, thus it really doesn't increase security. It is isn't a defense against a 51% attack, because more debasement doesn't correlate with better distribution of PoW resources. It is basically nonsense and we've been hoodwinked into throwing our money away to professional miners who are siphoning all the value out of Bitcoin by mining at < $50 per BTC cost. (Edit: and then by roughly 2032 or sooner, Bitcoin completely dies because mining funding has to come nearly all from transactions and the coin becomes highly deflationary, but long before then we will have replaced Bitcoin)
This is why I have tried to move entirely away from viewing PoW as security, because it isn't by itself security. I view PoW only a Sybil prevention mechanism for obtaining a consensus on nominated resources, which an aspect of driving the security of the inertia that results from those resources. Without PoW, anyone could nominate themselves and there'd be no convergence of the inertia (which is the precisely what I expect for Iota once someone writes a client other than the one they release to game theory their protocol) other than meta-protocol convention and community coordination.
The only need for the PoW in my design is to prevent a Sybil attack on the distributed confirmation resources. A 51% attack that orphans a legitimate chain of these statements about resources, can't undo the reality of the inertia that has been established on that orphaned chain. It can supplement the resources, but attempting to take away resources that already intertwined in the inertia will be ignored by all those nodes which are bound to lose income from unwinding that inertia.
I look forward to reading more details about your definition of inertia as it pertains to consensus design with great enthusiasm
The key is that when propagation is orders-of-magnitude faster than the block period, and there is no way to Sybil attack the network due to PoW consensus, then lying about having not propagated is statistically and objectively filterable as fraud. Thus the 51% attack falls away. There are more details that need to be explained.
In Satoshi's design the nodes want to be on the longest chain of PoW. In my design, they want to be on the longest chain of PoW which is not incongruent with the propagated inertia. There are two aspects (PoW and inertia) interlocking and supporting each other synergistically. The reason Bitcoin (Satoshi's design) can't do this distinction is because there is no inertia orthogonal to PoW. If you are thinking the PoW nominates the inertia, so the inertia is not orthogonal, then don't forget another key detail which is duration of nomination is much greater than any statistically objective honest orphan chain length (duration). Essentially my design is a form of anti-aliasing. More PoW resources can gain a larger share of the inertia, but the thing about inertia is that each participant views their own inertia as a priority and so any entity trying to blacklist another's inertia is going to be viewed statistically and objectively as fraudulent and thus that fraudulent PoW can be filtered out and its inertia spirals down. In other words, greater share of resources doesn't allow you to violate the laws of physics about propagation.