Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin?
So the 49 - 99% attacker could nominate ALL the confirmation nodes in his private chain, but attacker can't convince the rest of the network that his chain is valid, due to my rule that attacker must include all the nominations from propagated block announcements (which attacker didn't refute within the 6 second window...because as I explained, the attacker can't refute because the rule requires him to restart his computation of next block after each block announcement).
He doesn't need to convince the rest of the network. The problem is insidious; the attacker presents a majority of fully compliant, well behaved nodes with which the rest of the network becomes acquainted and then sits and waits until he needs to pull of his attack, at which point the minority of the network will go along with his presented truth because they will already be nominating his 'sleeper' nodes.
Unless I have misunderstood the entire design, which is very possible
What attack? Up thread I already refuted for my design, all the known attacks on Satoshi's PoW (at least those presented by you and I thus far).
Fully compliant confirmation nodes can't do any attack. If they attack, they are no longer compliant and will be ignored by the honest network (not only ignored but all their transaction fees will be confiscated due to "fraud proofs" recorded by other confirmation nodes and you can see my recent posts relating my design to Segregated Witnesses).
Afaics, having nodes "sleep" (which I guess you mean they do only compliant activity while "sleeping", since you can't mean sleep in terms of being unknown because all nominations are public on the PoW block chain) doesn't aid the attacker in any way in terms of executing any attack at any future time.
I think I can deduce why you are misunderstanding (and it is an expected reason that can probably only be conquered with a very thorough elucidation). It seems you are conflating the concepts of attacks on PoW chains with attacks on, by, or leveraging confirmation nodes. These are orthogonal concepts in my design. For example, confirmation nodes do not gain any power to issue double-spends (all confirmations have an objectivity that can't be violated and that is another design secret and I won't discuss that now but you can look at Dash's Evolution design for a hint).
Again I will reiterate that afaics separating the concerns into PoW and confirmation nodes as orthogonal, provides paradigmatic elimination of the attack vulnerabilities in Satoshi's design.
In my (monumental?) prior two posts, I was starting to lay out some of the paradigmatic gains that arose from separation-of-concerns for transaction confirmation and PoW chains...
As you anticipated, afaics you've entirely misunderstood the design. I think it is improbable to give readers the holistic view (any more than I have already elucidated) without detailing the entire design in a well organized and quite lengthy white paper. And I am not ready to do that yet. Wait a few more weeks please. This discussion has been a "sneak preview".
I think you will be able to offer more constructive and deeper insights once you can understand well every detail of my block chain design. As of now, you will be handicapped by lacking full and deep elucidation from me.
P.S. thank you for injecting your peer review. Look forward to more of it once the design has been released in a well organized paper.