Re: Segregated witness - The solution to Scalability (short term)?
Now the one facepalming is me.
miner(dodgytx)opcheck='imlegit' ->RoadchainSWlite -> otherSWlite-> otherSWlite ->otherSWlite -> otherSWlite
roadchain does no checks and on the data and see's the fraudproof opcode 'imlegit'.. and accepts it and relays it on.. now 4 people have dodgy information.. for no reason.. they cant use it but the 2000 people using the SWlite keep passing it on.. all blindly thinking its valid..
miner(dodgytx)opcheck='imlegit' ->frankyFullNode -||BIN||
franky ignores the opcode'imlegit' and checks the real data. see's its really dodgy and deleted it, its not relayed and its business as usual
then waits for a valid block to be solved, checking that and then relaying that only if satisfied the rules are met
I dunno where you're getting this thing "opcode 'imlegit'", and it looks extremely stupid on your side.
If a verifying node sees a fraudulent block, it constructs a compact fraud proof and relays it instead. The particular mechanism and criteria are not clear yet, but the idea is something like that. DoS protection in necessary anyway.
What you're doing here is making up a stupid non-existent solution that no sane person will accept and then ridicule it. You basically ridicule your own idea
What's more funny is that this whole idea of fraud proofs is present in the Bitcoin Whitepaper under the name 'alerts', in section 8. "Simplified Payment Verification".
Quote
As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more
vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify
transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated
transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to
protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid
block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to
confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to
run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.
vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify
transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated
transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to
protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid
block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to
confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to
run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.