The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will trump any few individuals' will to power.
I'm sorry but I can't agree. This is not something you can guarantee now and certainly not in the future.
I'm not making guarantees, I'm extrapolating using game theory/self-interest.
Given that:
- all budgets are public
- budget abuse would erode public perception, and
- the value of the currency is determined by public perception
why would a large shareholder be movitated to damage the value of their
holdings?
Just to separate things:
1) Immediate concern - Misleading proposals pushed through with limited follow-up, essentially leading to large holders paying themselves for doing nothing. I don't agree that budget abuse will necessarily erode public perception faster than hypothetical large holders make money. (Again, not saying this is happening, just suggesting that it is a discussion worth looking into carefully.)
2) Long-term (and more significant) concern - There may be ways for Dash holders to reduce the risk in their holdings while retaining voting rights. They could vote Dash into the ground while making money. I would be in over my head if I tried to explain derivatives and empty voting in relation to DACs because I am still trying to wrap my head around the key concepts. However, I think we should be very careful about relying heavily on the "self-interest" argument. Ownership of assets does not necessarily equal proportional economic self-interest in the current corporate world and there's no reason to expect such a simple relationship in the DAC world either. In fact, I believe that anonymity compounds this issue significantly and is a problem worth discussing seriously.