I already had explained this and I don't understand why it is so difficult for you to comprehend that the payers must send a PoW with their transactions. The majority of the PoW comes from payers, and the payers have every incentive to approve the longest chain, so their transactions are included on the block chain. If an individual payer wants to attempt a double-spend, he doesn't have enough PoW by himself to accomplish it.
Profitability of mining has nothing to do with the incentives in my design. I hope I don't have to explain this again.
Again you miss the point entirely. An individual payer CAN have a majority of PoW in exactly the same way as it can happen in bitcoin, except you've totally removed the incentive to use this power for good instead of evil.
An attacker is up against the entire world's CPUs (and remember I designed a very efficient CPU hash in 2014). And who is going to finance that mining farm, when mining is unprofitable?
Remember your point (seems you forget your own points, haha) was that in PoW an attacker must sustain his attack at ongoing cost. But how does the attacker finance this cost when none of his costs are being recouped. I think you fail to consider many factors including for example that mining farms near hydropower generation plants have Bitcoin costs in the range of $50 per BTC. Thus mining centralizes and hashrate centralizes because of the economic profitability of mining.
What evil can the attacker do to recover his costs of mounting the attack? What is the incentive to do evil and how does the attacker finance the attack? And what can he accomplish with an attack? Of course a miner can short the coin, but can he recover enough profit from a short to pay for a 51% attack sustained long enough to do a double-spend that any large sector of the ecosystem cares about? If payees are following the correct probabilities (per Bitcoin 101 below), then the 51% attacker needs win at least 6 blocks to execute a double-spend of any significant value (unless he can spread out his spends in many smaller transactions). But this is the same for Bitcoin's design as well. There is no difference due to the mining being profitable or unprofitable. Bitcoin miners who are renting aren't incentivized to short the coin, otherwise the owners of mining equipment with their sunk capital costs wouldn't rent out mining hardware.
You are completely out-of-touch with the reality of the economics of mining. The reason Bitcoin is so vulnerable is because mining is profitable and thus finances the creation of ASICs and mining farms.
Also you make the assumption that the professional mining farms in profitable PoW of Bitcoin (i.e. Satoshi's design) don't have an incentive to do evil. I explained upthread that they will roll over when the government regulates them, because it is entirely in their interest to do so. Please don't ask me to repeat those points I made upthread since you didn't disagree with them at the time.
Tell me this: how can a recipient know when it is safe to accept a transaction in your design?
Same as in Satoshi's design. When the acceptable number of blocks have been confirmed since the block that included the transaction.
Define 'acceptable' - you will find it impossible because there is nothing to value the PoW being expended.
Did you not learn Bitcoin 101?
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf#page=6http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.2009You can't have branches which don't conflict on double-spends without a total ordering. You can't get total ordering without LCR unless you use a clock to timestamp each node of the tree. Period.
What does it mean to have a conflicting double spend? (a double spend is itself obviously a conflict, so you mean a conflict of conflicts?)
I mean that without a total ordering you can't decide which double-spend to discard when those double-spends appear in separate branches of the tree.
The fact that you can't seem to comprehend what is being written is indicative of that you are not qualified as you seem to think you are on the analysis of consensus systems.