them utilising the methods Greg describes for sending blocks.
The greatest irony is that after that dozen back and forth set of emails where I was completely unable to communicate to Peter R the ability of miners to completely remove the communication delay from the time of mining, amid his irrelevant poetic waxing about information theory... He went on to submit a paper to Ledger describing the idea, without attribution... which incorporated most of the previous elements I'd already described in public-- save one main difference: it screwed up the design so that participants would take orphan risk for new transactions by only adding them to the pre-consensus by attempting to put them in a Bitcoin block.
Indeed you did inspire me to work on subchains, Greg. For two reasons:
1. I didn't buy your claim that things like orphaning risk couldn't contribute to proof-of-work security.
2. I wanted to better understand how pre-consensus through weak blocks might affect the fee market (I could see that the fee market wouldn't collapse, but I wanted a better understanding for how the math would play out).
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...without attribution...
I actually did cite you, Greg. Here's a screen shot:
I had originally included another citation, but an internal reviewer suggested that pointing out more of your economic misunderstandings might come across of unnecessarily hostile.
