TPTB's premise is that IP addresses and other metadata are being spied on. You can't transact in basecoins, even just to move from one mixer to another, without encountering that exposure.
My point is (especially for corporations) all their proprietary data privacy is done in zerocoins and then balances combined into basecoins to cash out of the mixer, which doesn't reveal anything but the agggregate value of the private data that is in the zerocoins. That is a distinct and epic advantage over Cryptonote/RingCT.
smooth, I don't understand why you are being irrational and wasting your time down a dead-end. Surely there are more valuable and more productive things for you to work on than continue with what will eventually fail and have to be abandoned. It is very perplexing to me. You say you are hedged/diversified, so I don't understand the religious behavior.
Sometimes we need to slay our malformed babies in order to give way for planting our seed again. I took the axe to the desks w.r.t. to my WordUp software when Atari's Tramiel decided to buy Federated Dept Stores and focus on making calculators instead of competing with Apple and Windows! That was a wise move as my LinkedIn career history shows.
I don't agree with him that transacting in zerocash without worrying about your metadata exposure is of any real value, and neither does anyone else, but that's a different issue.
I think
I already explained how the issue (especially for corporations) is much more compelling. So far, I have seen no rebuttal to the specifics I explained w.r.t. to corporate use. I am still awaiting Zcash's
promised blog post comparing their technology to Cryptonote/RingCT.
Appeal to authority is useless. Open source your reasons.
Also, TPTB operates under the premise that miners will be centralized and engage in 51% policy attacks. If they do that they can refuse to allow you to move your basecoins to the new mixer unless you identify yourself.
What I believe about mining is irrelevant to this issue (although I do believe it is possible to decentralize PoW control while centralizing verification for scaling, thus to get best of both), because I am asserting the big market for privacy is not from hiding from the government (which I pointed out to you many times can
charge the cost of 51% attack to society as China apparently has done to Bitcoin! and thus different game theory economics than a miner that needs to be profitable) and a viewkey should be provided to the government so they don't need to block your transactions (which applies to every anonymous coin). So the point is that Zcash will provide provable privacy against everyone except the government (whereas Monero/CN/RingCT/CoinJoin/CoinShuffle/Dash/ShadowCash will not).
Note I have not forgotten my past point that the government can't necessarily keep secrets we are forced to give them, because they have employees which may not always be loyal, e.g. Edward Snowden. Thus again I see block chain privacy as more useful for corporations which can negotiate with the government to provide controlled access and not a viewkey to all transactions. We individuals can't negotiate with the totalitarianism that society will go through over the next decade or two.
I agree with you that the possibility of moving to a reset coin has some potential value. It also has potential risks. The more times your have to perform the setup, the more opportunities there are for it to be compromised. Especially if it becomes routine and people get careless. Zcash has not said anything about planning to do these kinds of resets, as far as I've seen.
Again if the corporations who want to use it all participate in the multi-party setup, they would have to collude to cheat themselves, which doesn't make any sense.
P.S. You might look into the timing side-channel attacks issue as a potential point of comparison to bring Zcash back down to similar level of anonymity reliability as RingCT (but I doubt it):
https://github.com/Electric-Coin-Company/zcash/issues/5