Removing the rules against actions that the network protocol expressly forbids against the will of an economically significant portion of users, and risking a persistent ledger split in the process is not a comparable thing. It's something that Bitcoin Core strongly believe it does not have the moral or technical authority to do, and attempting to do so would be a failure to uphold the principles of the system. It's not something to do lightly, and people who think that it's okay to change the system's rules out from under users who own coins in it are not people that I'd want to be taking advice from-- that kind of thinking is counter to the entire Bitcoin value proposition.

The other things you're talking about are fully compatible updates which users can voluntarily choose to participate in or can choose to ignore. Users opt into applying them to their own transactions, and they shouldn't really be anyone elses business.  Neither of them are forces applied to third parties.

In the case of Opt-In RBF-- that is purely local node policy, not even a consensus rule. If even one miner wants to use it it could not be prevented even if all the other users and developers and all miners agreed that it was desirable to prevent. Worse, there are already miners out there doing full replacement without the signaling. Without the positive uses being able to opt in and voluntarily choose to use replacement, we will likely see more of that spread sooner. So you have something that causes no harm, potentially delays harm, and is fully optional being used to attack Bitcoin Core? I think that is really lame. Especially since replacement of non-final transactions was a feature in the _very first_ version of Bitcoin that was only turned off much later because as it was originally implemented it was a flooding vulnerability. In people's zest to politically manipulate others into disliking Bitcoin Core it seems that some have really lost the plot.

We all wait with abated breath while you go and cite that "explicit" definition for us.

It's nonsense in any case: When you're talking about the hard rules of the system-- the limits that make it valuable and tractable-- no amount of hashpower is enough to override it. Not 99.9%.  If a miner violates the hard rules of the system they are simply not miners anymore as far as all the nodes are concerned. This is an integral part of the checks and balances that create and preserve the incentives of the system: Miners can't just steal a bit on the side, their power is very strongly shifted to either participate honestly or DOS attack the whole thing (in which case the users would presumably change the proof of work), but not attack the system while continuing to have it usable.

But really, if any of you have an honest desire to continue a conversation-- go convince the OP to retract the wonky and non-factual claim. Otherwise this is all just a hall of mirrors.