Just because you cannot quantify the number of traitors does not mean the system will produce invalid results within the bounds. This is true of any BGP consensus and has absolutely nothing to do with trustless, decentralised solutions.
For Christ's sake, you cause me to repeat all the points I made upthread over and over again.
I already explained to you invalid results where the observers can't know whether the state was attacked or not, which
is a Byzantine fault! There is no way to compute this risk and in fact the asymptotic risk is 100% (probability = ~1) because all decentralized consensus systems must centralize (which I explained in detail upthread).
Whereas, with a quantified probability of traitors (e.g. hardware MTBF), the risk of Byzantine fault is computed. Which was the intent of Lamport et al's paper.
Your points are irrelevant, you don't understand the problem as stated. You are desperately clinging to wikipedia definitions in an attempt to save face, when the honest thing would be to admit your mistake; no one will judge you for it.