Nonsense. Number of non-mining nodes (call them what they are: wallets) is irrelevant to Bitcoin security.
Completely wrong. This implies that the entire network could be comprised of SPV nodes that
trust a small, centralized group (miners) regarding the validity of the blockchain. That is not a trustless system at all.
More nonsense, it
doesn't. Am assuming that your inference process works something like this:
1. You claim that the hundreds of padlocks thrown about on our lawn help secure our house.
2. I disagree, and point out that the padlocks littering our lawn add nothing to our security.
3. From this, you infer that I'm saying that our house is secure without those padlocks.
That's flawed reasoning. I've never suggested that Bitcoin is either "a trustless system" or secure, merely that non-mining nodes don't *add* anything to security.
Anyone reading can see this is a ridiculous analogy. Instead of inventing an irrelevant analogy, try proving the actual statement wrong. If "non-mining nodes [are] irrelevant to Bitcoin security," that implies either that "Bitcoin is secure with only mining nodes" or "Bitcoin is insecure no matter what."
My statement above specifically addresses the former. It is absolutely not secure with only mining nodes. The burden is on
you to prove the second statement.
The analogy is fine.
Could you explain specifically how a decentralized network of nodes is equivalent to "padlocks thrown about on our lawn?" I've explained many times, and provided evidence for how they are the only defense against Sybil attacks (from miners or otherwise).
At this point, the burden is on you to provide at the very least some theoretical basis that bolsters your statement that one could "trivially/inexpensively" render all non-mining nodes "impotent" by running some other nodes, and therefore profitably attack the system, presumably forever or until it is rendered insecure, and bitcoins valueless. You can suggest that one can cheaply bring some nodes online, but that isn't sufficient to prove anything about plausibility and likelihood of an actual attack.
There have been past double-spend attacks by miners, so we know that rational miners will attack nodes if it is profitable to do so. That they have not used Sybil attacks specifically does not
prove that it is not (and was not historically) possible to do so, but it certainly does not help your claim that non-mining nodes do nothing to secure the system. If they did nothing -- like padlocks on the lawn -- wouldn't that suggest it was cheap enough to attack them with Sybils?
You need to bring something more to the table than twisted logic to suggest that non-mining nodes are "irrelevant" to the security of the network.
Proving the negative is notoriously hard (often impossible), and yet that's exactly what you're asking of me.
I'm asking that you provide a modicum of evidence, logic, for a statement you made -- i.e. more than just a mere repeated opinion. I'm asking that you refute all of the points I made about how non-mining nodes do contribute to security, rather than deleting them from my quote and neglecting to address them.
Proving the positive, OTOH (that nodes *do* contribute to security), is a must. For the statement to have a defined, positive truth value, that is (because no proof != false, so you might have an "undefined," see
here).
So it would be much more appropriate for me to ask *you* to prove that nodes contribute to Bitcoin security.
Please do so.
Given the theoretical nature, there are limits to the idea of "proof" here, but I've still done a lot to that end in this discussion. At this point, the burden is on you to refute the arguments:
Every node must receive and process every transaction in every block. That distributes blockchain data to all nodes who enforce the rules, rather than a system where nodes trust a central source. [i.e. decentralization as a solution for the security faults of trust]
The more nodes that exist that are enforcing the same rules, the more likely the longest valid blockchain data that you receive from them is accurate.
If there are only mining nodes, the userbase, by definition, trusts miners. Hence why the existence of non-mining nodes secures bitcoin: by decentralizing hash power from validating nodes.
One of the primary determining factors in whether a Sybil attack is possible is how cheaply identities (nodes) can be generated. The more nodes there are, and the more decentralized said nodes are, the bigger the cost of mounting a Sybil attack, since attackers must set up more nodes in more distinct locations.
There have been past double-spend attacks by miners, so we know that rational miners will attack nodes if it is profitable to do so. That they have not used Sybil attacks specifically does not prove that it is not (and was not historically) possible to do so, but it certainly does not help your claim that non-mining nodes do nothing to secure the system. If they did nothing -- like padlocks on the lawn -- wouldn't that suggest it was cheap enough to attack them with Sybils?
Non-mining nodes obviously aren't impotent because we are talking about theoretical Sybil attacks, not historical ones.
In summation: Nodes enable a decentralized, trustless system to exist in the first place (securing users' funds from centralization failure). They are the system's defense against Sybil attacks (preventing double-spending and censorship attacks) from miners or other attackers. Further, nodes, by self-validating, also decrease the number and scope of attacks on users of the system by eliminating trust-based protocols. Getting back to my analogy, you are asking me to prove that the padlocks littering the lawn don't contribute to our security. Because, if I'm unable to, they do.
At least, according to you.
Uh, what? I stated a case for nodes being essential to the system's security. That case does not depend on your ability to argue against it. I'm simply asking you to provide any logical argument or evidence for your claims that nodes are irrelevant to the system's security.
I'm asking that you explain how a decentralized network of nodes is equivalent to padlocks littering the lawn.... if it is, you should be able to refute my claims above. Instead you're setting up a straw man that mischaracterizes everything I said, while ignoring every point I made.
This is what I said:
If "non-mining nodes [are] irrelevant to Bitcoin security," that implies either that "Bitcoin is secure with only mining nodes" or "Bitcoin is insecure no matter what."
My statement above specifically addresses the former. It is absolutely not secure with only mining nodes. The burden is on you to prove the second statement.
If you're suggesting that miners attacking non-miners is irrelevant because bitcoin is otherwise insecure anyway, the statement is false prima facie since, from a non-miners' perspective, it is very relevant to the security of their money. It is therefore relevant to the integrity of the system because the system is composed predominantly of non-miners.
I'll even help you to get your proof going. One tack might be to prove that it's economically unsound for the miners to counter "a_node_you_like" with a node of their own.
There is no such thing as proof in game theory and economics. In any case, for this to be relevant, you need to make the case that this is sufficient to profitably attack the system. Otherwise it's just a meaningless metric.