#1 does not apply because the design is such that validation is split between partitions. This has been explained to you numerous times! #1 would be
What is 'the' design? This is a thread about Ethereum, where full nodes do validation and miners produce blocks.
a design without partitions and where every full node verifies every transaction, which obviously can't scale and which due to economics that I
A partitioned network operates exactly like two independent networks. If invalid transactions propagate throughout a network, that network is in trouble, regardless of whether there are partitions or not.
#2 is why the design for partitioning (or delegation of validation) has to maintain a Nash equilibrium, meaning the requirement that there exists no game theory advantage for partitions (or delegates) to lie about their validation. This point about Nash equilibrium has been explained to you numerous times!
My point is that if you allow block producers to produce invalid blocks, that will be gamed by those who do validate, leading to SPV miners being pushed out of business.
Are you fucking blind?
No need to take that tone.
You are clearly only thinking about your design here. Merging partitions increases the strength of the network; the only problem is providing the
correct incentive to do the merge.