There are some egregious distinctions.
- Attacker identifies his own UXTO which the community can then decide to blacklist with a checkpointed fork. Thus taking away the attackers income and causing the attack to be a loss.
- Attacker will have a very difficult time purchasing things at sufficient scale that doesn't identify him in the real world. Whereas stealing balances will be impossible to prove for cut & choose
- The victims can prove they were double-spent by long-range chain reorganization. This isn't an absolute proof of an attack, but community evidence gathering at any sufficient scale of attack should come to a consensus about the existence of an attack.
(Again, I don't see how this attack is specific to cut and choose.)
The problem is fundamental to block chain crypto-currencies. They inherently use a single validation (POW) to cover lots of transactions. The security assumption is that no one attacker can controls enough of the transactions to make roll back worth it.