Re: [neㄘcash, ᨇcash, net⚷eys, or viᖚes?] Name AnonyMint's vapor coin?
TPTB_need_war, you cannot prove nor disprove that the Sartre text Craig Wright supposedly hashed is a collision for SHA256.
I asked you to not do what you just did above:
Don't cherry pick my context to make inane non-rebuttals which side-step my holistic set of points.
You also pointed out that he supposedly has access to a supercomputer. Even with access to a supercomputer, he would not be able to find a collision as other researchers have already tried. Simply having a lot of computing power does not mean that he can find a collision.
Alternatively, Craig could have found a vulnerability in sha256, in which case a lot more things than just Bitcoin is screwed. If Craig did not responsibly disclose such a vulnerability and instead exploited it, this would be incredibly sketchy and dishonest behavior.
Alternatively, Craig could have found a vulnerability in sha256, in which case a lot more things than just Bitcoin is screwed. If Craig did not responsibly disclose such a vulnerability and instead exploited it, this would be incredibly sketchy and dishonest behavior.
The point is that with a supercomputer together with a new cryptoanalysis break, the two together might be required to accomplish the attack. I want you to know that if China's pools see nearly all the mining shares, then they are viewing about 268 of SHA-256 hashing power per annum which may or may not be fulcrum. Don't presume you know all the theoretical attacks that are possible.
The theory that the sha256 double hash is weaker than sha256 is false. It has been proven that performing multiple iterations of a hash is more secure than just one iteration. Specifically, many websites will store users passwords in the form of a multiple iteration hash.
You've made at least two mathematically illiterate errors in that quoted text:
1. Testing that double-hashing fulfills some criteria you have prechosen, says nothing about security against cryptoanalysis which your criteria has not considered.
2. Securing a password by iterated hashing (because it requires the dictionary attacker to perform the iteration cost on each dictionary trial) says nothing about the increased vulnerability of collision cryptanalysis. You are conflating two separate issues of security.
I am done speaking to these amateurs. Waste of my time.