http://9to5mac.com/2016/07/21/kickasstorrents-apple-id/

Enough said.

Edit: This is my favorite part.

Events kicked off in November of last year when an undercover IRS agent posing as a representative of a study program booked an ad on the site. That correspondence enabled them to identify an email address linked to both the site and KAT’s presence on Facebook, which led first to an IP address in Chicago and from there to a separate Apple email address (a me.com one).

Apple was served with a court order requiring it to identify any activity from that email address, and responded by releasing details of an iTunes purchase. The IP address for that purchase was found to be identical to one used to access the KAT Facebook page on the same day, providing the crucial evidence linking Vaulin to the pirate site.

For a truly anon solution which monero claims but can in no way truly achieve.
These reasons are why all anon fails.

Your IP address is not anon,
Your Browser info is not anon,
Your Email Address is not anon,
Your Bank Account which you linked is not anon,
Your address where you mailed or received goods is not anon,
there are no guarantees the person that did business with you did not sell your identifiable information.

All anon solutions will fail til they can solve all of the above.

 

The National Security Agency (NSA) commonly records Internet metadata for the whole planet for up to a year in its MARINA database, where it is used for pattern-of-life analysis. U.S. persons are not exempt because metadata are not considered data under US law (section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act).[51] Its equivalent for phone records is MAINWAY.[52] The NSA records SMS and similar text messages worldwide through DISHFIRE.[53]

25.
On  or  about  November  13,  2015,  an  undercover  IRS  Special  Agent  
(UC-1)  sent  a  request  to  the  email  address  pr@kat.cr  (an  email  account  listed  on  
KAT’s website for “press”),
9
 inquiring about advertising on KAT. Additionally on or
about November 17, 2015, UC-1 sent a private message on the KAT forums to the
9
 KAT’s website has made an email account available for “press” since at least as early as in
or about August 2009

administrator  “Mr.  White”  and  followed  up  with  another  email  to  admin@kat.cr.  
On or about November 24, 2015, UC-1 received a response from the email address
admin@kickass.to regarding UC-1’s inquiry and the two exchanged several emails
during which UC-1 provided the KAT representative with a link for an undercover
website purportedly advertising a program to study in the United States. The KAT
representative agreed to provide UC-1 advertising for $300 per day. During one of
the  exchanges,  on  or  about  December  9,  2015,  a  representative  of  KAT,  using  
admin@kickass.to,   provided   UC-1   with   banking   information   for   payment   to  
advertise on KAT’s website—a Latvian-based account held at Regionala Investiciju
Banka, account #LV32RIBR00185170N0000JSC, in the name of “GA Star Trading
Ltd,  9  Barrack  Road  Belize  City,  Belize”  (the  
Subject  Account
).  After  providing  
the  banking  information,  the  KAT  representative  instructed  UC-1,  “Could  you  
please  make  sure  that  you  don’t  mention  KAT  anywhere?”  in  connection  with  
payment to the bank for advertising.
26.
On or about February 8, 2016, UC-1 reinitiated contact with the KAT
representative. On or about February 19, 2016, the KAT representative responded
with   the   same   banking   information   for   the  
Subject   Account
.   The   KAT  
representative  stated  UC-1  “Please  make  sure  that  the  bank  details  are  entered  
correctly  and  you  don’t  mention  KAT  or  ‘for  advertising’  anywhere.  Could  you  
please also inform me when you send the payment?


30.
On  or  about  May  11,  2016,  in  response  to  a  request  from  UC-1  for  a  
new bank account, the KAT representative provided UC-1 with another account to
receive   funds   for   advertising,   an   Estonian-based   bank   held   at   AS   Eesti  
Krediidipank,   account   number   *6107,   in   the   name   of   “Glomeratus   LTD,  
Beneficiary   address:   1   Straits   Parade,   Bristol,   BS16   2LA,   UK.”   The   KAT  
representative  wrote:  “Please  pay  attention  to  the  bank  details.  They  should  be  
entered  correctly.  Also  please  don’t  mention  KAT  and  ‘for  advertising  anywhere.’  
Could  you  please  inform  me  when  you  send  the  payment?”  On  or  about  May  13,  
2016,  the  KAT  representative  provided  UC-1  with  another  payment  method  for  
advertising,  a  WebMoney  account  as  well  as  an  account  for  a  Russian-based  
payment  system.  On  or  about  July  1,  2016,  as  part  of  the  undercover  operation,  
IRS  wire  transferred  $1,000  from  a  location  in  Chicago  to  the  Glomeratus  LTD  
bank account to purchase additional advertising.  
31.
The  investigation  obtained  bank  records  from  Latvia  pursuant  to  a  
request  under  the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Treaty.  Those  records  reflect  that  the  
Subject  Account
  received  a  total  of  approximately  €28,411,357  in  deposits  
between on or about August 28, 2015, and on or about March 10, 2016. The account
balance as of March 10, 2016, was €14,656. A sizable portion of the funds appear to

25
be  related  to  advertising  revenue.
10
  For  example,  there  are  deposits  totaling  
€199,828  from  a  Dutch  online  advertising  company  Adperium  with  a  memo  line  
“KAT  TC  REVENUES.”  The  deposits  also  include  €110,125  over  the  course  of  
fifteen periodic deposits from on or about September 1, 2015, to on or about March
2,  2016  from  a  known  KAT  advertising  partner,  MGID,  sent  from  a  Bank  of  
America account in the United States.
11
C.
KAT’s Use of Social Media
32.
The  operators  of  KAT  also  use  social  media  to  advertise  and  provide  
updates  about  the  website.  Records  from  Facebook  identified  that  on  or  about  
February  19,  2010,  a  Facebook  account  was  created,  titled  “official.KAT.fanclub.”  
Based on historical screen captures of KAT’s website, I have determined that since
at  least  August  2010  the  KAT  Facebook  Account  has  been  the  account  linked  to  
KAT  as  its  official  Facebook  account.  The  account  was  registered  to  the  email  
address  pr@kat.ph.  Based  on  my  review  of  screenshots  of  KAT,  I  know  that  KAT  
has  used  the  email  address  pr@kat.ph  to  receive  inquiries  after  switching  to  the  
domain kat.ph in or about April 2011.