Any way, I think I have thought of a solution for DE.

The key is to identify the attacker immediately so that all decentralized parties can apply my upthread blocking "Coin Days Destroyed" suggestion. The "Coin Days Destroyed" becomes the reference point that is signed by the owner of the resource, which thus apparently escapes from my generative essence conceptualization of the problem set.

So change to the protocol is the provider of the hash sends to the trade's counter party to sign it (hashed with the other party's UXTO address) so the counter party's UXTO can be identified. Then the hash provider (the potential jamming victim) posts this information in a timed refundable transaction to the block chain (spending to the payee contingent on releasing the hash). If the attacker never posts the reciprocal transaction on the other block chain, this enables anyone to identify that attacker and apply the Coin Days Destroyed filtering that I proposed upthread.

Note this eliminates the need for any fee. But I assume you can find some justification for a fee, such as perhaps keeping your source code for the DE app closed source and/or offering a centralized fee structure for matching orders, limit orders, etc.. You won't be able to steal funds, which afaik is the most significant advantage of DE over CE.

One way I contemplated is to have both parties sign the intention to trade, then they post it to this block chain. However, one might sign and the other might not, thus jamming the other party (in terms of computing the signature and the communication latency between the two parties). Also worse is that one party might sign more than one intention to trade or inadvertently do so if the attacker didn't sign immediately but later signed and published it to this block chain.