the problem I mean is not solved. It is not just from the locks to oppose trusted -- the problem is Now combination:
The fact in 8 blocks time it can stake.
The stake modifier in 8 blocks, given the explanation, is as known.
This all means someone can to test and to realize If creating an locked will allow him IN 8 blocks with (to the time) proposal. If locked pattern will not allow him to stake, they can test other possible (according to a different address, still by him) will allow him works. for he can try as many as he wants to he finds the outcome will stake. this should be a serious consideration
Oh, now I think I see what you mean, and you are correct. You are describing a "stake grinding" attack. I opened Qeditas up to this attack when I reduced the maturation age of locked non-rewards to 8 blocks. To avoid this attack, no asset should be able to stake until at least 512 blocks after its creation.
This will make passing through the bootstrapping phase (the first 512 blocks) difficult since there will need to be at least 512 distinct assets from the initial distribution attempting to stake. I only have approximately 10 such assets myself. Realistically, if there aren't sufficient participants for 512 assets to stake, then I suppose the mainnet should be delayed until there are. If there never are sufficient participants, then perhaps Qeditas will simply remain as a Proof of Concept implementation others can learn from.
None of this will prevent starting a testnet. On the testnet, I have decided to permit "fake endorsements" using a private key I hold. In this way, I can reallocate arbitrary coins on the testnet. My plan is to use this to give away (testnet) coins corresponding to the early Bitcoin block rewards. (To be clear: this is only for the testnet. Satoshi's complete portion of the Qeditas distribution on the mainnet will be available for Satoshi to claim.) In this way, it will be easy to ensure that there are over 512 assets staking when the testnet starts. I am still hopeful that a Qeditas testnet can be started sometime reasonably soon, though not hopeful enough to give an estimate. Finding out about this grinding attack makes me even more reluctant to give estimated dates.