- A miner finds a solution for a job/a block (do we have a terminology for this already?)
- They send the hash out, paying the tax for it.
- After a time that is long enough for the network to recognise their hash, they send the block
- They are rewarded for finding the block with the bounty
Since there already is a reward (i.e. the bounty), the miner already gets reimbursed in a way. The tax they paid could go out to a lucky PoS staker instead of returning it.
Now, I have a question about taxed hashes, though: Couldn't I DoS the system by creating doublespends/multiplespends? I mean, if the timeframe in which the taxed hash gets sent out before the block is shorter than at least one block, I could just send out a whole lot of bogus hashes with the same XEL as payment over and over again, couldn't I?
Hi ttookk,
regarding the first part:
- I am not sure how to call them correctly, for now we all have called them "bounty submission" which essentially are "solutions for a job". I think it's wrong to call them "blocks" as such solutions are just regular transactions and do not extend the blockchain by themselves.
- What you described would mean that the users have an unlimited number of time to reveal their hash. So yes, we could argue that we do not need a fixed deadline to reveal the hashes as miners (who have a paid tax on stake) will always have the interest to reveal their solution sooner or later.
- But what happens when they don't? A powerful attacker with lots of XEL could DOS work jobs. With a fixed deadline job creators would get reimbursed for the DOS attack by getting the tax. Without a deadline, they are just stuck with an "infinitely pending job".
regarding the second part:
- good point to think about who gets the tax ... does the user get it back, will it be used as fee, ... we could brainstorm about this a bit, sure!
- No, you couldn't send the same XEL over and over again, your "unconfirmed Balance" would drop to 0 eventually, preventing you from spending any XEL that you don't have.