Purely technically, as you point out, only miners need to agree amongst themselves to use rule set B, and then only a block chain according to rule set B will be built. But, as was pointed out regularly, and as was used erroneously as an argument indicating the power of non-mining full nodes, miners will not want to alienate users. Technically, they can, but economically, they would ruin themselves, because alienating the users who sustain the market cap, and who are finally the buyers of their minted coins would kill the revenue of the miners, as they will now technically mine coins nobody wants to buy.
But an army of non-mining full nodes, in disagreement with the miners (and the users) has no power to impose its rule set, whether that rule set is a "new" one (a kind of sybil attack with an army of nodes) or the "old one" (as "guardians of immutability"). They can at most initially perturb the communication of transactions and blocks, and will in the end be ignored.
That was my point.
But an army of non-mining full nodes, in disagreement with the miners (and the users) has no power to impose its rule set, whether that rule set is a "new" one (a kind of sybil attack with an army of nodes) or the "old one" (as "guardians of immutability"). They can at most initially perturb the communication of transactions and blocks, and will in the end be ignored.
That was my point.
Glad to see the part in blue finally sunk in.
In none of my references , did I infer the users were not part of the full nodes only the miners,
The Business Users combined with their own dedicated Full Nodes to the accepted standard of compliance,
can block the miners non-compliance thru ignoring their nonstandard blocks (which prevents theft of their Personal Business Inventory) & the Economics reprisals the miners would suffer from the Business dropping BTC.
Which was my point.
