...
And in that entire tirade, your only argument is 'someone else called it a problem'.
And now you won't even quote me or respond on point, because you got #REKT.
If you say so. Of course, you've
still not responded to a single element of my claim.
Your anointed vision, epistemological closure, and metaphysical certainty don't count as evidence.
Here I've responded to the element of your claim whereby you believe yourself capable of deducing future events with perfect, irreproachable clarity. Obviously that's insane, and so I do indulge in a bit of pushing back against your imaginative hubris.
Well, no. You've responded to nothing but your own straw man.
Incentives appeal to motivations. Different people have different motivations. In this case, an attacker responds to your precious magical "mining incentives" differently than an honest (or at least non-adversarial) miner.
Here I've responded to the element of your claim's internal logic, ie the mechanism of action which you believe understanding gives you singular prescient insight into empirical (to be determined) outcomes.
Well, no again. The incentives are what they are. Sure some miner can play the role of 'attacker', and include a transaction that takes an inordinate amount of time to validate. My claim is that incentives are aligned to render this a non-problem.
Riddle me this: built off a parent of the same block height, a miner is presented -- at roughly the same time:
1) an aberrant block that takes an inordinate amount of time to verify but is otherwise valid;
2) a 'normal' valid block that does not take an inordinate amount of time to verify; and
3) an invalid block.
Which of these three do you suppose that miner will choose to build the next round atop?