CB is Segwit's Pet minion.
Do your Research on Segwit & LN, that way when you call CB a Liar, you can do it with
.
https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/5vbofp/initially_i_liked_segwit_but_then_i_learned/You wanted people like me to support you and install your code, Core / Blockstream?
Then you shouldn't have a released messy, dangerous, centrally planned hack like SegWit-as-a-soft-fork - with its random, arbitrary, centrally planned, ridiculously tiny 1.7MB blocksize - and its dangerous "anyone-can-spend" soft-fork semantics.
Now it's too late. The market will reject SegWit - and it's all Core / Blockstream's fault.
The market prefers simpler, safer, future-proof, market-based solutions such as Bitcoin Unlimited.
The damage which would be caused by SegWit (at the financial, software, and governance level) would be massive:
Millions of lines of other Bitcoin code would have to be rewritten (in wallets, on exchanges, at businesses) in order to become compatible with all the messy non-standard kludges and workarounds which Blockstream was forced into adding to the code (the famous "technical debt") in order to get SegWit to work as a soft fork.
SegWit was originally sold to us as a "code clean-up". Heck, even I intially fell for it when I saw an early presentation by Pieter Wuille on YouTube from one of Blockstream's many, censored Bitcoin scaling stalling conferences)
But as we all later all discovered, SegWit is just a messy hack.
Probably the most dangerous aspect of SegWit is that it changes all transactions into "ANYONE-CAN-SPEND" without SegWit - all because of the messy workarounds necessary to do SegWit as a soft-fork. The kludges and workarounds involving SegWit's "ANYONE-CAN-SPEND" semantics would only work as long as SegWit is still installed.
This means that it would be impossible to roll-back SegWit - because all SegWit transactions that get recorded on the blockchain would now be interpreted as "ANYONE-CAN-SPEND" - so, SegWit's dangerous and messy "kludges and workarounds and hacks" would have to be made permanent - otherwise, anyone could spend those "ANYONE-CAN-SPEND" SegWit coins!
Segwit cannot be rolled back because to non-upgraded clients, ANYONE can spend Segwit txn outputs. If Segwit is rolled back, all funds locked in Segwit outputs can be taken by anyone. As more funds gets locked up in segwit outputs, incentive for miners to collude to claim them grows.
My fear with LN is rather the opposite: that propagating "waves of panic" will overwhelm the block chain with transactions, because the amount of transactions pending on the LN network can in principle be orders of magnitude larger than what a block chain can handle (that's its main idea !). So if a block chain can handle, say, 100 000 transactions per hour, and the LN network has 10 million transactions pending in 10 minutes, and there's a panic wave going through the network, those 10 million transactions will need to go on-chain which will create a backlog of 100 hours, often passing the safety time limit of regularisation, and huge opportunities to scam.
Your fears are confirmed , article from Jul 5, 201612:28 PM EST by Kyle Torpey
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/here-s-how-bitcoin-s-lightning-network-could-fail-1467736127/And also what would happen in this scenario if the locks on the main chain expire before the tx from LN can be pushed back to the main chain, it would be a bit like double spending issue no ?
@IadixDev,
Nice, you see the problems with LN also.

How to Steal LN Funds from the LN WhitePaper itself. https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdfPage 49 thru 51

Improper Timelocks
Participants must choose timelocks with sucient amounts of time. If insuf-
cient time is given, it is possible that timelocked transactions believed to
be invalid will become valid, enabling coin theft by the counterparty. There
is a trade-o between longer timelocks and the time-value of money. When
writing wallet and Lightning Network application software, it is necessary
to ensure that sucient time is given and users are able to have their trans-
actions enter into the blockchain when interacting with non-cooperative or
malicious channel counterparties
9.2 Forced Expiration Spam
Forced expiration of many transactions may be the greatest systemic risk
when using the Lightning Network. If a malicious participant creates many
channels and forces them all to expire at once, these may overwhelm block
data capacity, forcing expiration and broadcast to the blockchain. The re-
sult would be mass spam on the bitcoin network. The spam may delay
transactions to the point where other locktimed transactions become valid
9.3 Coin Theft via Cracking
As parties must be online and using private keys to sign, there is a possibility
that, if the computer where the private keys are stored is compromised, coins
will be stolen by the attacker. While there may be methods to mitigate
the threat for the sender and the receiver, the intermediary nodes must be
online and will likely be processing the transaction automatically. For this
reason, the intermediary nodes will be at risk and should not be holding
a substantial amount of money in this \hot wallet." Intermediary nodes
which have better security will likely be able to out-compete others in the
long run and be able to conduct greater transaction volume due to lower
fees. Historically, one of the largest component of fees and interest in the
nancial system are from various forms of counterparty risk { in Bitcoin it
is possible that the largest component in fees will be derived from security
risk premiums.
A Funding Transaction may have multiple outputs with multiple Com-
mitment Transactions, with the Funding Transaction key and some Commit-
ment Transactions keys stored oine. It is possible to create an equivalent
of a \Checking Account" and \Savings Account" by moving funds between
outputs from a Funding Transaction, with the \Savings Account" stored
oine and requiring additional signatures from security services.
