Edit: I think I already see the math error in @Peter R's thesis, but wait let me study carefully to the end of the paper. The big hint is his cost of block space goes to 0 when debasement rate (misnomer when called "inflation rate") goes to 0. It is because his math is not properly relativistic (which is surprising given he claims he is a physicist).
I saw that math problem within 1 minute. My followup was delayed because I was
having a private chat with someone.
The problem I see with @Peter R's thesis is his
equation for the miner's revenue is not relativistic. He talks about that equation at the
6:30min point in a video.
Compare his equation with
my math explanation, and you see that Peter's conceptualization employs the average orphan rate for everyone when everyone chooses the same propagation time. The average orphan rate reflects the systemic waste of hashrate due to conflicts over which block to build the next block on. But the key point is that this waste is shared by all miners, so it isn't a cost because the difficulty readjusts commensurately, i.e. the overall profit in the system is determined by the difficulty relative to total block rewards. Peter's conceptual mistake is that it is the relative advantages that miners have over each other that determines relative profitability and this is why the cost of block space doesn't go to 0 when debasement rate goes to 0.
You see PoW is an entirely relative ecosystem and if a 51% attacker wants, he can set the profitability as high as the market will bear, because he can orphan all blocks that aren't his. And even a 33% selfish mining attacker can orphan all blocks that are not his more than 33% of the time (which is why selfish mining is a profitable strategy).
So the problem with Peter's conceptualization is it is the relative profitability between miners that matters. He tried to frame his math in terms of some absolute, which is why he math is broken which should have been obvious to him when the cost of disk space went to 0 with 0 debasement (which it doesn't in a correct model that understands that the cost of block space is only relativistic in terms of relative profitability of miners).
So that is why my math conceptualization is the correct one. And that is why there is a Tragedy-of-the-Commons and no fee market without a block size limit.
I have PM'ed @Peter R. He will remember me, @AnonyMint, as we had debates and discussions on these forums as far back as 2013.
Raiden ~= LN, but it can actually be implemented because ethereum doesn't have to worry that in few years+ miners will need the fees to be able to provide security. Bitcoin will never have LN because miners want the fees.
What is the official ETA on Raiden? And separately the realistic ETA?
Hasn't the logic on LN been that the miners will see the light that they need to allow LN so they get the fees from the higher valued txns without destroying the growth from the lower valued txns, but you are I guess arguing a Tragedy-of-the-Commons wherein the miners can't think long-term and want to extract maximum value from the existing supply of transaction demand. Hasn't that been what all the wrangling behind the scenes between Core and Chinese cartel has been about? But if they can get a 51% cartel (and keep it hidden with a Sybil attack), then they might be able to align their priorities more long-term? But is it inherently impossible to have a long-term focus because the battle for who has 51% is open to all possible competitors so there might always be someone else willing to borrow more money and make more political handshakes. So I think I am seeing your point. Hmmm. The Scalepocalypse clusterfuck is even worse than I predicted it would be back when I first predicted the transaction fees and blocksize scalepocalypse back in 2013.