If you wanted to upend Core, then you should have more competent people who would have advised you that unbounded block size doesn't have an equilibrium.
If you have successfully demonstrated that unbounded block size cannot reach an equilibrium
outside a majority-collusion environment, I have missed it.
Yes you missed it. I have
already explained the math for why there is no relationship between an
average orphan rate and a cost per byte (which is a necessary prerequisite for a supply curve as explained by @Peter R's paper). In other words, if we model that every miner has the same orphan rate, then there is no level of block size which is more or less favorable to the miner, because difficulty adjusts to the same level for all the miners. In other words, the wasted hashrate of the orphan rate is paid for by income from the block because all miners have the same costs (@Peter R's model inherently presumes that hashrate and propagation delay are uniformly distributed).
It is only when we model relativistic orphan rate (which @Peter R's paper doesn't even consider) that we will see any relative profit levels and able to model orphan rate as a cost. @Peter R should have realized this, but he apparently didn't quite realize that his model was meaningless although he did mention some of these issues that perplexed him in his concluding remarks.
Once we do model differing orphan rates for different miners, then the optimal strategies for mining come into play. And if you work out the game theory of that, you realize that collusion and centralization are the only possible outcome.
Also I received a reply in private from one of the people I asked to peer review the issue:
I watched Peter R. video. You're right to point out that his arguments are undermined by
1) propagation delays not having much impact until blocks are really huge, at which point running full nodes will be very hard and the system is hopelessly centralized.
2) these delays do not even matter when using trusted headers-first.
If your argument is that there is no equilibrium in a majority-collusion environment, then your fear is as valid for today's Bitcoin than it is under unbounded blocksize. Nakamoto consensus is -- as far as we know -- dependent upon 'a majority of honest [miners]'.
You are making a similar error as those two others did upthread. A 51% (or even 33% selfish mining) attack is not a change in protocol. In other words, in BTC the miners can't make huge blocks, because it violates the protocol limit of 1MB.
And as a practical matter, Bitcoin operated just fine for multiple halvings with no practical bound on blocksize.
There was minimum advised fee and there were pools doing anti-spam such as I think I've read that Luke Jr's pool rejected dust transactions. I haven't studied that period of time in great detail, so perhaps someone else would be better qualified to discuss that with you.