It seems to me that
a) it would be exceedingly hard to properly develop detection algorithms for "malicious reorg" detector
b) if you succeed at a) you don't need no litecoin, you just keep around the blocks being reorged away until you are convinced that reorg was "not malicious".
c) you can, of course, just halt everything and have community "heavy hitters" decide in IRC which part of the reorg was "good" instead of doing it with "and then a miracle occurs" automagical "malicious reorg" detector, but as long as you don't discard the blocks involved (which does not require litecoin) you don't really need litecoin in this process.
Part C is where the process would break down and where litecoin would shine. In March, the "heavy hitters" in IRC had the benefit of being able to reliably contact and influence the majority of the hash power in a short amount of time and persuade them to implement the desired solution, and they had the benefit of a ready-made solution (a version to roll back to) so that nobody needed to do anything objectionable. Without both of those, the devs in IRC would have had far less power than they appeared to enjoy.
If a core feature of Litecoin were that mining nodes can accept operator(user) influence, those mining Litecoins get a decentralized pulpit from which to announce their collective opinion as to which fork of the Bitcoin chain is correct. Even in the absence of that, Litecoin can implement automated validation rules with respect to the Bitcoin chain that would be too cumbersome for Bitcoin to adopt... example, Litecoin can be programmed to automatically refuse to endorse large Bitcoin reorgs without gaining explicit operator consent, which for a well-connected Litecoin node is typically a good policy.
Bitcoin community has the option to adopt, or not adopt, the Litecoin consensus, just in case it's wrong (default is to not adopt). By doing this, it leaves Bitcoin with a semi-automated oracle to suggest a singular, neutral, consensus-based "Plan B" recommendation for future Bitcoin fork situations. For example, on March 12, the chain reorg that was deliberately orchestrated was desirable... the Litecoin community would endorse the target branch through operator UI, and in the event Litecoin block chain failed to gain consensus favoring the branch we were trying to accept, Bitcoin miners would react by selecting "do not listen to Litecoin" as input.