but if pools were to change the rules they would get orphaned
2017-01-29 06:59:12 Requesting block 000000000000000000cf208f521de0424677f7a87f2f278a1042f38d159565f5
2017-01-29 06:59:15 ERROR: AcceptBlock: bad-blk-length, size limits failed (code 16)
No, if SOME pools would change the rules. But we are considering the case where ALL pools fix the rules (the same ones, or the same change).
You are just printing what your local full node would tell YOU. But if all miners are in agreement on the rules (old ones or new ones) - that's the case we consider - then there's no orphaning. Because only miners can orphan blocks, by building on other blocks.
(btw, strictly speaking, an invalid block is not orphaned but rejected: the definition of orphaning is a VALID block that is not built upon ; by definition, blocks in the chain are valid).
and while say pools BCDE are creating their blocks ontop of B for 16 hours.
pool A gives nodes blocks that are rule A acceptable. and pool A get to spend the funds(pool Awins every 10 minutes, zero competition)
First of all, no.
If you want to prove that full nodes can impose their verification onto mining pools, you must be able to prove that in the case where all mining pools are agreeing amongst themselves ; otherwise you do not distinguish the effects of a hard fork, and the effects of the power of the full nodes, which is what you want to prove.
In other words, if you want to prove that full non mining nodes have decision power over miners, you must be able to prove that they can impose their rules also over a set of mutually agreeing mining pools.
So the Gedanken experiment is simply that: all mining pools (of any significance, say the 20 biggest) AGREE on a set of rules, and the full nodes DISAGREE. It is in this Gedanken Experiment that you have to show how the full nodes are going to impose their rule set over those of the mutually agreeing miners.
We are NOT talking about users, and not talking about miners making different chains and forking. We are talking about how full nodes "keep the miner pools in check". So show me how the large majority of full nodes is going to impose its rules against all miner pools mutually agreeing.
Moreover, even outside of the argument, the forking pool that agrees with the full nodes will not make a block every 10 minutes:
it will make a block at exactly the same rate as it was winning blocks when in competition, because that's given by the
constant difficulty. So if pool A was winning a block every 3 hours, it is still going to be able to make a block every 3 hours, grossly. And, again, this doesn't prove anything about the power of full nodes ; this only indicates what happens when pools fork.
Stick to the case where all miners agree on a set of rules, where the full nodes don't agree with, if you want to show the power of full nodes imposing their rules on miners.