51% of the CNPs does not accomplish anything.
Evil signing peers may only propagate to their evil CNPs. Thus you've solved nothing.
Except that it solves the propagation weakness. Now there *are* two defined chains, regardless of any evilcorp shenanigans. The second chain will not be lost. If evilcorp controls 90% of the CNPs, that means 1 in 10 of them is carrying the honest chain. It won't take very long for any non-network node to find the missing portion of consensus.
I have some serious game-theory adjustments to the simplistic 90% attack as well to make it far less viable than it even already should seem. But those are details that need not be explained until implementation, because they are not relevant to showing the futility of this attack.
"Playful" is entirely disrespectful of our time.
Except that you have refused to see the reasoning behind each aspect until you have discovered the worthiness of it on your own. And you have repeatedly derailed me in trying to get you to see the overall picture. The implementation details are irrelevant until you do. So it is your own fault.
We can require in the protocol that signing peers are not allowed to propagate to other signing peers, thus they can not withhold. All communication must be done through these other CNP-type peers. But we can't stop them from controlling the CNPs they wish to propagate through. And there is no way to require them to propagate through every CNP.
But as long as they can't prevent the fork, they can't take control, so none of this is necessary or worrisome unless you expect evilcorp to control the entire view of the network. With the efficiency of the system, this borders on completely impossible. Even peers who only maintain SH sigs (that 1kB/s for 5 million SHs figure I previously described) will know who caused the fork. On a sufficiently large network, evilcorp will have to fool the entire world.
There are layers of interconnectivity that must be unraveled here. You have tried to reverse engineer the system and have not been successful. I tried to get you to stay on one course and failed because I let you bog me down with less relevant details. I won't make that mistake again.