Why don't you just use as a salt for each roll a random # generated by http://www.random.org/ or another true random generator site (this one uses atmospheric noise I believe)? Wouldn't that close any loophole for the operator or someone who has compromised the site and can see the server seeds to cheat?
I'm not familiar with everything random.org has to offer.
But is it probably fair? Is there any way I can prove to the player that the seed that made them lose was fairly chosen by random.org, and not carefully calculated by JD to make them lose?
It wouldn't change anything unless random.org were told the bet in advance, recorded it and disclosed it - as otherwise you could change what you bet once you knew the result from them. And if they recorded the bet BEFORE revealing the random number then suddenly we have to start trusting that THEY aren't betting and exploiting it.
Beyond a certain point investors just have to trust - not just in this but in many investments. How do investors know mining companies who have a machine break down didn't swap a good one for a bust one of their own? How do investors know an investment/trading funs isn't creaming off cash by buying/selling from alt accounts? etc.
At a certain stage people have to stop worrying about things that are only detectable from statistical analysis after the fact. Short of having a 24/7 live video feed it's hard to stop or detect a lot of types of fraud. You have to either be willing to assume some degree of good faith or just not invest.
Before dooglus invented provably fair, we just played Dice Games and hoped for the best. Now that JD came out we understand how useful that was. In this thread we tried to find a RNG that the owner can't manipulate, but if it's not possible then that's fine. It's not like investors will go to a competitor who has it.
First of all: dooglus is the inventor of provably fair? That's damn cool.
So what would be needed to remove the possiblity for the site operator to defraud the investors, would be an verifiable external source of entropy over which the site operator has no control and that all participants can verify independently. If the bitcoin blockchain generated blocks more rapidly, I suppose that could be used. Or maybe not, because the operator could still discover a block then place a huge bet (knowing all the secrets) right before submitting the block to the network. Maybe using a block a certain number of steps ahead of the current block - the site operator would have to discover and withhold all blocks between now and then, and then place the bet and immediately broadcast all the blocks before any other node found a block. It would make it more difficult for the site operator to cheat, but bets would no longer be "instant", so I guess the whole game would lose appeal.
Anyway, it's a really interesting problem (but if the inventor of provably fair hasn't found a solution, what chance do I have?) - sorry for derailing the thread.
