also known as a k of n multisig
this means that in a 2-of-5 multisig where 3 people dont have to sign,

as oppose to
interactive, where by its n of n, meaning it has to be a 5 of 5 or a 3 of 3 where everyone has to sign



this means when users see the funding public key, they dont know how many other signers there are or are needed in total
and when the funds do move.. never get to know who specifically did sign

because the address doesnt tell them it is a 2 of 5..
because the address doesnt tell them who the other 4 people are

making it easy for whomever set it up to tell 3 guys its a 3 of 3 when in reality its a 2 of 5, and in reality whomever set it up owns 2 keys himself

so the 3 innocent guys dont realise its a 5 counterparty address.. all they can see is that their key is part of AN address.. but not know how much of a part...


much like a rigged poker game where 2 people set up the game, but hide in the backroom, letting  another 3 people play a table thinking they are only playing a 3 man game between themselves... then the 2 backroom guys can crash the poker game and steal all the chips. leaving the other 3 penniless and wondering who stole their chips. blaming each other

coding may work for privacy and lack of sole control.. but those same utility and features allow the ability to steal/blackmail

even carlton banks highlighted last year that a 'fund manager' with a special key can be sole controller while everyone else is offline, when he was describing how he can get rich offering services as a fund manager/escrow/arbitrator for second layer / multisig proposals.

lets hope bitcoin goes down the n of n (interactive) route to avoid fund manager thieves while others sleep. and not the k of n(non interactive) route
though the pitfall of n of n. is that if one users system crashes and they lose their key.. everyone elses funds are locked.

so i feel musig still needs ALOT more work and running scenario's before even being close to being a BIP