Re: [ANN] Official AnonCoin thread - Client Update!! (Native I2P, TOR nodes)

Apologies if this has already been asked upthead. I didn't have time to read the entire thread.

Does Anoncoin not view high-latency for I2P as critically urgent as I do?

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=273197.msg2950363#msg2950363
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=276849.msg2955966#msg2955966
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=273197.msg2950849#msg2950849

I2P doesn't plan on implementing until version 3.0? When is that ETA?

Quote from: K1773R on August 17, 2013, 11:22:13 PM

only bitcoin and anoncoin so far work with i2p

Bitcoin doesn't require all winning blocks to be sent over I2P, thus in a high-latency setup, those miners who want their awarded coins to be anonymous, would be at a timing disadvantage.

I assume anoncoin requires all winning blocks to be sent over I2P?

nope, you can send it over i2p, TOR (to clearnet or HS nodes) and clearnet.
the main idea about i2p in anoncoin is to eliminate attacks to find your location and making listening on others connections impossible. (from a technical view)

Don't we want miners to be anonymous when they are awarded coins for PoW of the winning block?

So then if they use the high-latency setting to be confidently anonymous, they are at a speed disadvantage to those miners who don't want to be anonymous (e.g. the corporations, etc).

Also does anyone understand and agree that without high-latency, the NSA knows who you are? (due to timing attacks are possible on low-latency mix-nets)

nope, i2p is end to end encrypted, nobody (beside the involved ones) knows what passes from where to where, ie someone else cant see who published it or how high their latency is.

Timing attacks work regardless of end-to-end encryption.

My understanding is that all low-latency mix-nets are subject to timing attacks. Perhaps you should read up on the research before making a claim? Or am I missing something?

Note Tor and I2P are both Chaum mix-nets (so what applies to low-latency attacks of Tor applies also to I2P):

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/oakland05torta.pdf

ok, good to see someone with knowledge around here

i2p user (A) finds blocks, broadcasts to all users in i2p (UI), now some of the UI are connected to clearnet, some user (B) broadcast it over clearnet to the other nodes, so with a timing attack you could find user B but not user A