Remember even when submitting with multiple nodes there will be a convergence point to a legitimate peer, and then that legitimate peer will be banned for transmitting too quickly, thereby segmenting the network for 4 hours but keeping many legitimate users safe.
Why do you assume that someone with more than 51% needs to submit blocks faster than the 5 in ten minutes? Very bad assumption. How are you going to deal with that when a number of legit users get banned. Miners will not take to that too well. What happens when someone hits you with a diff attack and causes about half your network to exceed the limit and gets banned therefore opening up the entire block chain to an attacker remaining within the defined limits?
Stop arguing over semantics, this was designed to stop some double spending attacks, basic difficulty attacks, and multipools(and it does that very well). When I say "virtual immunity" - I don't mean total immunity, I mean immunity from pretty much anyone out there who realizes that the cost of the attack would be greater than the gain.
Another bad assumption on your part. What if an attacker is paid to attack a chain and has zero intention to trade the coins? What if an attacker does it just because they're bored or just to do it?
The system is designed to cut off an affected portion of the network in the event of a multi-pronged attack, they will simply reconnect in 4 hours and continue on the main chain.
Again start cutting off legit miners and see how fast your chain dies.
Also in banning "legit" peers, what are you going to do when someone builds a list of lets say a 1000 peers, connects and starts sending "bad blocks" to them, ban them all? That in itself is an exploit I could build in only the time needed to scan for peers.
I applaud you guys for trying to find a solution to attacks but the smart thing to do is develop them, keep them quiet to keep and don't invite public ridicule with some posted half baked ideas that were obviously never tested
~BCX~