I'd like to think that people will agree to proof of stake before surrendering bitcoin to government or corporate management, but you may be right. People are extremely stubborn and consensus is a damned hard thing to obtain.
Proof of stake has thus far proven unworkable.
The main problem with Proof of Stake appears to be that is that there is nothing at stake: In PoW systems you burn energy to mine, and that mining is only worth while if the chain your mining on survives long term, so you are generally incentive mine the chain most likely to survive. In PoS the rational strategy is to mine all possible forks constantly, because doing so costs you nothing.
Oh, this again. Don't you have any integrity at all? [As in you know the above to be false, yet that does not prevent you from repeating it time and time again.]
I suggest you add some color to my ignore button because I fail to see value in discussion with you. This is not because you are stupid, but because interactions with clever and dishonest people are rarely rewarding. You lie when it suits you, see below. You also don't understand incentives, see below. If you were right here, then my analysis in the pdf would be wrong...
That page is pretty embarrassing. There is absolutely no mention of the fundamental flaw in PoS consensus which none of your proposals have addressed: As of yet none of the proof of stake proposals are workable because there is nothing at stake! If someone is PoS mining it is in their best interest to attempt to concurrently build an honest chain
as well as all possible attack forks just in case one of them happens to win. Under most schemes
this is the profit maximizing move, in all I've seen so far its at least neutral. Mining an attack under PoW actually involves _spending_ something and taking the risk other miners will extend it. PoW works because your work is at stake so even a very small amount of honest miners make mercenary rational miners behave honestly too.
Moreover, I don't see why you argue here that it better aligns incentives. Parties can't mine PoW without having a validating node (or face the extreme risk other miners will toss them off on forks). All it does is redistribute control, which might be useful if not for the fact that it makes attacking more attractive for selfish participants. I was hopeful of these techniques but as of yet I don't see how any can be workable.