I thought you rejected that idea with the doomsday post.
. . . .
If you print more to pay people redeeming their commodity tokens and hypercoins, the value of your coin is going to fall even more.
In the doomsday post I rejected printing new bitcoins to shore up the escrow fund, but not the hyperbitcoin idea. I probably wasn't very clear with that.
If all reserves are stored in coins, how it is possible that there's no default if the price of the coin gets too much reduced?
If there aren't enough speculators to offset a drop in bitcoin values, coin/anticoin holders would be exposed to bitcoin price fluctuations, but there wouldn't be an outright default
I still don't know how this tokens are issued. I thought the chain issued them at the spot price known inside the chain thanks to the miners, but you say their price doesn't depend on the spot price.
If they are issued by finding a counter-party, what gets the counter-party exactly? How can you make money with antiOil-tokens?
See this post in the sister thread for an example of how coins/anticoins would be issued:
http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=31645.msg400477#msg400477antioilcoins would go up when oilcoins go down, so buying them is like shorting oil. I expect some rules would have to be in place to keep them balanced, which I'll admit I haven't given enough thought to yet (see below).
Where the money both parties pay goes? What happens if the price of the commodity multiplies by 10000?
When coins and anticoins are created, they are sold for bitcoins which go into escrow. That last question (what happens if a commodity goes up by 10000x?) is a fantastic one. Let me take a shot at how that would work:
Let's say oil is rising rapidly. As the price of oilcoins starts to rise, the price of antioilcoins would fall at the same time. The bitcoins in escrow backing oil are now out of balance (more bitcoins backing oil coins than antioilcoins), so the protocol needs to either use escrow funds to buy oilcoins on the open market or it needs to mint new antioilcoins out of thin air and sell them on the open market (within the bitcoin network), or some combination of both until balance was restored. The balance of buying oilcoins and selling antioilcoins would be decided by what combination left the escrow fund the healthiest. The only risk of default I can see is the case of an instantaneous huge price move combined with everyone trying to sell their coins/anticoins all at once, which seems pretty unlikely.
I just made that up. Does anybody see a problem with that model?