Post
Topic
Board Майнеры
Re: Безопасность таблетки для 1080
by
farsky
on 05/07/2018, 21:28:21 UTC
вдруг потрут посты там, сохраняю сюда
Devs, can you please explain the following behavior after the binary is launched?

Quote
Callback: 2.21.242.213:80
watadminsvc.exe
svchost.exe

Callback: 2.21.242.237:80
watadminsvc.exe
svchost.exe

Callback: 46.226.136.5:53

Quote
POST /6b06490d-f9fd-424c-8b6d-83edc4369e89/
HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Close
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: application/soap+xml
User-Agent: WSDAPI
Content-Length: 733
Host: 192.168.56.153:5357

Quote
POST /fwlink/?LinkId=151645
HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: WAT
ClientContent-Length: 2500
Host: go.microsoft.com

S\agt;\alt;GROUPPEERNAME\agt;258e2e9f3bd43a297f050566f5788283bd087a85.HomeGroupPeerGroupClassifier\alt;/GROUPPEERNAME\agt;\alt;GROUPFRIENDLYNAME\agt;HomeGroup\sPeer\sGroup\alt;/GROUPFRIENDLYNAME\agt;\alt;/PEERINVITATION\agt;\r\n\l/INVITATION>\lGUIDNAME>{2D866516-217B-4A95-B31D-A9174BBCBE17}\l/GUIDNAME>\lOWNER>HAPUBWS\l/OWNER>\lOWNERID>ffff80eb2050085c6f3dee2f51f0e12ca9592d9b.HomeGroupClassifier\l/OWNERID>\lOWNERMACHINENAME>HAPUBWS-PC\l/OWNERMACHINENAME>\lLASTCHANGED>131567727744841250\l/LASTCHANGED>\lHOMEGROUPSIZE>1\l/HOMEGROUPSIZE>\lADDRESS>[fe80::7007:58d0:7dee:d3e2%11]:3587\l/ADDRESS>\lDIGITALHASH>-----BEGIN\sCERTIFICATE-----\r\n8FkcvuaS5BO6pbSEzPjpH7hORXNBnZZo4tsk3BH8Qt/tNvqIaIXH13t6xb3bcucC\r\nmYXGg9f0t74N7HyeY3ARTfbtSvURq4HJ5RNpyIFJK0SrEfpllxNPOf40tV4hcrQe\r\nEBBn0RIsOiFKIBZb1YscyetmIDy9fbfQeemD02Hl2jRuPr6SmbHiajDkwAh38pSA\r\nk1XQjdcHQTHM438w0wNDNnuwI/JXEYirq0ZwblOnNPrfuc2JLFa7FJCIpc5jrHNN\r\n2dHa3EXhFpS/euOMwWSg+Jot+bXoGlaiSBwbMQrm8JD+UvcVpim2XG42rLztZLOF\r\nhsEzS1cGRUAJ7vqG8Q9lLA==\r\n-----END\sCERTIFICATE-----\r\n\l/DIGITALHASH>\l/HOMEGROUP_RECORD>

Sandbox analysis: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/1261052e34b3205dc04f5dd9e4b76d2649dbcda738dc8e2665b07f56d659e716/5ae113157ca3e11cac3236dc


I've read through the thread (though I admit not every bit of it) and I'm very surprised to see nobody has been concerned about whether this executable does any funky things like ever connect to the Internet at any point, read any files off disk, etc? Has anyone monitored it (long enough) for any of those things?

Looks nice, but all of a sudden someone anonymous just deciding to help everyone by providing a closed source executable should normally raise just a healthy dose of suspicion.
Multiple users have confirmed the process is accessing two IPs (2.21.242.213/2.21.242.237) over encrypted connection. Not sure why this is necessary.



Neither do I. The security concerns raised in this thread of using a seemingly random, closed-source binary which calls back to Akamai servers over an encrypted channel are legitimate. Until an explanation is provided by the developers for the usage of these two IPs, you can temporarily block your system(s) from reaching them by using the following:

Windows (as Administrator):
Code:
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="ETHlargement Callback" interface=any dir=out action=block remoteip=2.21.242.213
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="ETHlargement Callback" interface=any dir=out action=block remoteip=2.21.242.237

Linux (as root):
Code:
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 2.21.242.213 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 2.21.242.237 -j DROP

As far as I can tell, it has zero impact on the efficacy of the application nor the final hash rate.
I've read through the thread (though I admit not every bit of it) and I'm very surprised to see nobody has been concerned about whether this executable does any funky things like ever connect to the Internet at any point, read any files off disk, etc? Has anyone monitored it (long enough) for any of those things?

Looks nice, but all of a sudden someone anonymous just deciding to help everyone by providing a closed source executable should normally raise just a healthy dose of suspicion.
Multiple users have confirmed the process is accessing two IPs (2.21.242.213/2.21.242.237) over encrypted connection. Not sure why this is necessary.



Neither do I. The security concerns raised in this thread of using a seemingly random, closed-source binary which calls back to Akamai servers over an encrypted channel are legitimate. Until an explanation is provided by the developers for the usage of these two IPs, you can temporarily block your system(s) from reaching them by using the following:

Windows (as Administrator):
Code:
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="ETHlargement Callback" interface=any dir=out action=block remoteip=2.21.242.213
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="ETHlargement Callback" interface=any dir=out action=block remoteip=2.21.242.237

Linux (as root):
Code:
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 2.21.242.213 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 2.21.242.237 -j DROP

As far as I can tell, it has zero impact on the efficacy of the application nor the final hash rate.

This will be useless if in code dev is using fdqn as target address, but anyway what kind of concerns might be with traffic? Yes, probably it is good to know what dev sending back to their servers, but I personally don’t care, as I have nothing saved on rigs, execpt OS and miners.

Cool, we have servers. Who knew? If you find their location, let me know, my spare one just slipped under the couch cushions.

If you want to know what those are accessing, go ask Microsoft. We didn't create watadminsvc.exe or svchost.exe. Or use the Linux version.


Devs, can you please explain the following behavior after the binary is launched?

Quote
Callback: 2.21.242.213:80
watadminsvc.exe
svchost.exe

Callback: 2.21.242.237:80
watadminsvc.exe
svchost.exe

Callback: 46.226.136.5:53

Quote
POST /6b06490d-f9fd-424c-8b6d-83edc4369e89/
HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Close
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: application/soap+xml
User-Agent: WSDAPI
Content-Length: 733
Host: 192.168.56.153:5357

Quote
POST /fwlink/?LinkId=151645
HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: WAT
ClientContent-Length: 2500
Host: go.microsoft.com

S\agt;\alt;GROUPPEERNAME\agt;258e2e9f3bd43a297f050566f5788283bd087a85.HomeGroupPeerGroupClassifier\alt;/GROUPPEERNAME\agt;\alt;GROUPFRIENDLYNAME\agt;HomeGroup\sPeer\sGroup\alt;/GROUPFRIENDLYNAME\agt;\alt;/PEERINVITATION\agt;\r\n\l/INVITATION>\lGUIDNAME>{2D866516-217B-4A95-B31D-A9174BBCBE17}\l/GUIDNAME>\lOWNER>HAPUBWS\l/OWNER>\lOWNERID>ffff80eb2050085c6f3dee2f51f0e12ca9592d9b.HomeGroupClassifier\l/OWNERID>\lOWNERMACHINENAME>HAPUBWS-PC\l/OWNERMACHINENAME>\lLASTCHANGED>131567727744841250\l/LASTCHANGED>\lHOMEGROUPSIZE>1\l/HOMEGROUPSIZE>\lADDRESS>[fe80::7007:58d0:7dee:d3e2%11]:3587\l/ADDRESS>\lDIGITALHASH>-----BEGIN\sCERTIFICATE-----\r\n8FkcvuaS5BO6pbSEzPjpH7hORXNBnZZo4tsk3BH8Qt/tNvqIaIXH13t6xb3bcucC\r\nmYXGg9f0t74N7HyeY3ARTfbtSvURq4HJ5RNpyIFJK0SrEfpllxNPOf40tV4hcrQe\r\nEBBn0RIsOiFKIBZb1YscyetmIDy9fbfQeemD02Hl2jRuPr6SmbHiajDkwAh38pSA\r\nk1XQjdcHQTHM438w0wNDNnuwI/JXEYirq0ZwblOnNPrfuc2JLFa7FJCIpc5jrHNN\r\n2dHa3EXhFpS/euOMwWSg+Jot+bXoGlaiSBwbMQrm8JD+UvcVpim2XG42rLztZLOF\r\nhsEzS1cGRUAJ7vqG8Q9lLA==\r\n-----END\sCERTIFICATE-----\r\n\l/DIGITALHASH>\l/HOMEGROUP_RECORD>

Sandbox analysis: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/1261052e34b3205dc04f5dd9e4b76d2649dbcda738dc8e2665b07f56d659e716/5ae113157ca3e11cac3236dc

You're literally looking at something that is 100% normal and functioning in Windows. You're basically asking us to explain how Windows functions on binary launch. GG.

This just in: OhGodACompany is responsible for all Windows updates.

EDIT:

Wow, look, there are actually  three addresses! Microsoft's tool is also causing a DNS request to be made to access go.microsoft.com! Wow! Totally hacked! Wow!

Wow! It's also contacting 192.168.56.153 which would create martian packets on the internet that would not get routed. Wow, totally  can't be something internal to the analysis service, we are contacting the Russian mafia with silly tricks! Wow! Much hack! So scary!