Even if, by some fluke, the Bitcoin community — developers, miners, and users — agreed to the hard fork, such a change would then open another can of worms. Now that the Bitcoin network would be able to identify a particular block's miner(s) at the consensus layer, and now that the Bitcoin community has been emboldened by a successful hard fork that supposedly mitigated the centralization of mining power, what's there to stop Bitcoin from undergoing new forks (soft or hard) that prevent certain miners from mining new blocks once they are deemed to have too much mining power? While this may seem like a good thing on its surface — mining pools would be further disincentivized from amassing more than 50% of Bitcoin's mining power — this essentially introduces an element of censorship into the network at the consensus layer and sets a precedent for further censorship. Mining pools would, of course, evade such censorship by splitting up their mining power to appear to the network as multiple discrete entities — i.e., a Sybil attack.