This has nothing to do with my credentials. I don't need any kind of authority and didn't claim it. I'm telling a simple story about how a decentralized infrastructure like tcp/ip turned to be hidden by centralized, second layer protocols and you don't understand a word of mine.

I'm not talking about LN, I'm against any second layer protocol on bitcoin, I maintain that bitcoin IS NOT an infrastructure it is a complete system, it should be, it is meant to be.

Off-chain/second layer solutions of any kind, by any name are just a statement of failure for bitcoin.

You guys are hypocrites, little, sneaky hypocrites. Instead of focusing on bitcoin as a system, an electronic P2P cash system, you are giving up with it and are rushing to LN as the solution, the shelter.

One use of nLockTime is high frequency trades between a set of parties. They can keep updating a tx by unanimous agreement.  The party giving money would be the first to sign the next version.  If one party stops agreeing to changes, then the last state will be recorded at nLockTime.  If desired, a default transaction can be prepared after each version so n-1 parties can push an unresponsive party out.  Intermediate transactions do not need to be broadcast.  Only the final outcome gets recorded by the network.  Just before nLockTime, the parties and a few witness nodes broadcast the highest sequence tx they saw.

Idea #1: Suppose a company can issue its own version of the bitcoin concept as "stocks" (bitstock?).  I know this has been talked about on other threads as well.  What would be the implications of high-frequency trading on the infrastructure borrowed from bitcoin?

It's for contracts.  An unrecorded open transaction can keep being replaced until nLockTime.  It may contain payments by multiple parties.  Each input owner signs their input.  For a new version to be written, each must sign a higher sequence number (see IsNewerThan).  By signing, an input owner says "I agree to put my money in, if everyone puts their money in and the outputs are this."  There are other options in SignatureHash such as SIGHASH_SINGLE which means "I agree, as long as this one output (i.e. mine) is what I want, I don't care what you do with the other outputs.".  If that's written with a high nSequenceNumber, the party can bow out of the negotiation except for that one stipulation, or sign SIGHASH_NONE and bow out completely.

The parties could create a pre-agreed default option by creating a higher nSequenceNumber tx using OP_CHECKMULTISIG that requires a subset of parties to sign to complete the signature.  The parties hold this tx in reserve and if need be, pass it around until it has enough signatures.

One use of nLockTime is high frequency trades between a set of parties.  They can keep updating a tx by unanimous agreement.  The party giving money would be the first to sign the next version.  If one party stops agreeing to changes, then the last state will be recorded at nLockTime.  If desired, a default transaction can be prepared after each version so n-1 parties can push an unresponsive party out.  Intermediate transactions do not need to be broadcast.  Only the final outcome gets recorded by the network.  Just before nLockTime, the parties and a few witness nodes broadcast the highest sequence tx they saw.