Post
Topic
Board Pools
Re: Optimal pool abuse strategy. Proofs and countermeasures
by
Ryo
on 04/02/2011, 18:20:45 UTC
If you critize my trustworthy

I have no opinion about you, good or bad. My interest is what can be done, not what is actually done.

Quote
then yes, I can cheat users all the time, I don't need to hide stats to do so.

As the pool was before, with full statistics, users could check whether their revenue was really ((50/total_shares) * nb_shares). They could also, by talking with each other, evaluate if the pool reported a plausible number of total shares. While there were ways for the pool to cheat, the statistics allowed users to check it didn't cheat too much.

My understanding of the way your pools works now is: miners find shares, they receive bitcoins, but they can't know how much the pools pays each share. As long as you release data on how much a share is worth, "cheating" becomes possible. I was wondering if you had found a way to preserve both openness and fairness.

I believe having the value of contributed shares decrease over time would also fix the cheating problem, ensuring that the expected gain of joining is the same at all times. And you'd still be able to display the statistics like before.