5. scaling onchain is not just about raising the blocksize. its about making it more expensive for users who transact more often than those who transact less frequently.
EG imagine a person spend funds to himself every block. and was doing it via 2000 separate transactions a block (spam attack)
he is punishing EVERYONE else. as others that only spends once a month are finding that the fee is higher, even though they have not done nothing wrong.
the blocks are still only collating the same 2000tx average. so from a technical prospective are not causing any more 'processing cost' to mining pool nodes tx's into block collation mechanism. (they still only collate ~2000tx so no cost difference)
so why is the whole network being punished. due to one persons spam.
the person spending every block should pay more for spending funds that have less confirms than others. in short the more confirms your UTXO has the cheaper the transactions get. that way spammers are punished more.
this can go a stage further that the child fee also increases not just on how young the parent is but also the grandparent
in short bring back a fee priority mechanism. but one that concentrates on age of utxo rather than value of utxo(which old one was)
Multiple layer of confusions over there:
1- Spamming is bad for bitcoin but not a serious threat right now, besides transaction malleability which
is was a flaw and essentially have improved after SW, other spamming practices come with a cost. Making bitcoin
more resistant to spam is good but not an urgent agenda neither a relevant issue to on-chain scaling.
2- It isn't reasonable to consider it kinda "punishing others" when you make frequent txs. You pay fees, you utilize the service, that simple.
3- And it would be insane to encourage people to keep UTXO more occupied! Actually I'm working on a totally opposite direction. By any measure we need to keep UTXO as light as possible, UTXO is the problem and not the chain, chain always could be pruned, UTXO couldn't. I think people should pay even more when their balance is kept for a longer time than others. It occupies space!
Let's discuss an alternative approach:
Suppose as a decentralization measure we incentivize wallets to run a full node and participate actively in consensus by a replace-fee-by-work schema. In this schema wallets are free to do some work (solving an ASIC resistant hash function) and include a nonce
plus the hash of the most recent block they are ready to commit to. By confirming such transactions, miners could enjoy a tiny discount for the difficulty they need to approve their block and ready to be more generous with the fee they expect. Let's call it
Direct Commitment By Transactions.
For such a schema to work we need to give more weight to commitments to newer blocks and stop giving such a credit to transactions when they are committing to blocks older than 100 or so. More interestingly we could
discourage hoarding and occupying the UTXO too long, by means of another complementary technique which is even more disruptive and deserves to be called
Indirect Commitment By Transactions.
Traditionally, in bitcoin and its clones, ordinary transactions use a txid:[#ouput] format as their inputs. Although this approach has some benefits and provides a level of convenience for users it has drawbacks too. For instance, reply attack in forks wouldn't be possible if wallets was committing to the branch they are making the transaction for.
In Direct method above we have established such a possibility, now suppose we go even further and let transactions to refer to outputs by their relative position in the blockchain and give another bonus (difficulty discount) to miners for including transactions that spend younger outputs from the correct chain as by this reference they are
indirectly committing to the right chain, helping security.