...snip...
What do you think of the Cypherpunk movement?
What do you think of the Cypherpunk movement?
I'm starting to think we lost our way to a large extent.
Privacy is (still) mostly dead. Totalitarianism is ever present and increasing.
Many 'punks' seemingly gave up the 'good fight', became disenfranchised / maligned and/or sold out to 'the man' ...
22C3: We lost the war
- https://youtu.be/8bulE9vErfg
rop, frank: Ten years after We Lost The War
- https://youtu.be/P4k7RKx4OQM
...
Us bitcoiner's should learn to make better use of the privacy tools that already exist, for starters.
I for one wish I could focus more on doing these things for good, but needs must.
...
This is a very interesting topic. If a solution was found, a much better, easier, more convenient implementation of Bitcoin would be possible.
Originally, a coin can be just a chain of signatures. With a timestamp service, the old ones could be dropped eventually before there's too much backtrace fan-out, or coins could be kept individually or in denominations. It's the need to check for the absence of double-spends that requires global knowledge of all transactions.
The challenge is, how do you prove that no other spends exist? It seems a node must know about all transactions to be able to verify that. If it only knows the hash of the in/outpoints, it can't check the signatures to see if an outpoint has been spent before. Do you have any ideas on this?
It's hard to think of how to apply zero-knowledge-proofs in this case.
We're trying to prove the absence of something, which seems to require knowing about all and checking that the something isn't included.
Originally, a coin can be just a chain of signatures. With a timestamp service, the old ones could be dropped eventually before there's too much backtrace fan-out, or coins could be kept individually or in denominations. It's the need to check for the absence of double-spends that requires global knowledge of all transactions.
The challenge is, how do you prove that no other spends exist? It seems a node must know about all transactions to be able to verify that. If it only knows the hash of the in/outpoints, it can't check the signatures to see if an outpoint has been spent before. Do you have any ideas on this?
It's hard to think of how to apply zero-knowledge-proofs in this case.
We're trying to prove the absence of something, which seems to require knowing about all and checking that the something isn't included.
