However those attacks can't be mitigated by an airgapped computer, unless you format it after creating the paper wallet.
I wonder how many people using this set up fully encrypt their airgapped machine, and how many have no protection on it at all, assuming that no one else will gain physical access. If your airgapped computer (or at least the wallet file) isn't encrypted with a strong password, then it is far more vulnerable to a physical attack than a hardware wallet is.
Encryption with strong password to your storage drive and bitcoin wallet could help, unless you specifically meant $5 wrench attack rather than physically steal HW wallet, recovery sheet or your computer.
If someone is attacking you this thoroughly, knows you own bitcoin, and finds an encrypted drive or an encrypted file, it won't take them long to put 2 and 2 together. I suppose you could use a hidden volume to increase your plausible deniability; hide a wallet with a small volume of bitcoin on the outer volume, and hide your money wallet on the hidden volume, much like you would do with a passphrase on a hardware wallet.
If someone is willing to torture you for your bitcoin, then it is pretty irrelevant if you have a hardware wallet, airgapped device, paper wallet, or whatever.